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The Failed Superiority Experiment 
Christine P. Bartholomew* 
Federal law requires a class action be “superior to alternative methods 
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” This superiority 
requirement has gone unstudied, despite existing for half a century. This Article 
undertakes a comprehensive review of the superiority case law. It reveals a 
jurisprudence riddled with inconsistency as courts adopt diametrically opposed 
interpretations of the requirement. Originally crafted to encourage predictable, 
consistent class action decisions, superiority has mutated over the years into a 
dangerous wild card—subjectively used to stymie aggregate litigation. The 
solution is not adding a new requirement to the already onerous rules for class 
certification. Instead, judges should rely on existing yet currently underutilized 
case management tools and abandon the failed superiority experiment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Class actions are under attack. Once lauded as powerful 
mechanisms to deter predatory business behavior and supplement 
regulatory enforcement, they are now targets for tort reformers and 
conservative jurists.1 From the 2005 Class Action Fairness Act2 to a 
string of recent Supreme Court decisions,3 the trend is towards 
increasingly restrictive interpretations of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b)(3), the rule governing class certification of monetary 
claims.4 The legal academy has already addressed many of these key 
assaults.5 Yet one has gone virtually unnoticed. Unprincipled 
interpretations of Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement are an 
existential threat to the class action regulatory scheme. 
Under the superiority requirement, courts can only certify a 
class when it is “superior to alternative forms of adjudication.”6 
Congress adopted superiority to ensure the controlled growth of class 
 
 1.  Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475, 
1475–76 (2005); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731 
(2013); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 314 (2013). 
 2.  Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012). 
 3.  E.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 4.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 5.  E.g., Christine P. Bartholomew, Saving Charitable Settlements, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3241, 3242 (2015); Tyler W. Hill, Financing the Class: Strengthening the Class Action Through 
Third-Party Investment, 125 YALE L.J. 484, 487 (2015); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation 
Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 488 (2012); 
Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic 
Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 296–300 (2014); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment 
on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81 (2011); 
Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 124 YALE L.J. 2354, 2356 (2015). 
 6.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
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actions through “case-by-case experimentation.”7 Now fifty years later, 
judges are reaching diametrically opposed, irreconcilable 
interpretations of superiority even in analogous cases.8 
Two recent false advertising actions in different circuits 
illustrate the problem.9 Both involve nationwide classes. Both concern 
dietary supplements. Both share the same legal theories. Both cover 
purchasers unlikely to have kept receipts or other evidence of purchase. 
Despite these similarities, the circuits splinter on superiority.10 The 
Seventh Circuit granted class certification;11 the Eleventh Circuit 
denied it.12 
These are not isolated examples.13 Rather than consistently 
applying the requirement, courts infuse superiority with a conflicting 
assortment of factors, stripping away any cohesive screening function.14 
For example, some courts require plaintiffs to establish multiple 
factors, while others weigh them.15 Some courts only consider judicial 
alternatives, while others consider administrative and legislative 
 
 7.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 subcommittee completion notes Dec. 2, 1963 [hereinafter 
Completion Notes] (discussing how superiority would permit “case-by-case experimentation”) (on 
file with author). 
 8.  Compare, e.g., In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 699–700 
(N.D. Ga. 2008) (applying a restrictive superiority analysis), and Berther v. TSYS Total Debt 
Mgmt. Inc., No. 06-C-293, 2007 WL 1795472, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2007) (same), with, e.g., 
Quiroz v. Revenue Prod. Mgmt., Inc., 252 F.R.D. 438, 445 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (defining superiority 
generously), and In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 
1997) (same). 
 9.  Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015); Karhu v. Vital Pharms., 
Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 947 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 10.  Compare Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (affirming certification and finding superiority), with 
Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 947 (affirming denial of certification in part because of lack of superiority). 
 11.  Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658. 
 12.  Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 947. 
 13.  Compare, e.g., Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 
2011) (defining superiority narrowly and declining certification), with, e.g., Ortega v. Nat. Balance, 
Inc., 300 F.R.D. 422, 426 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (defining superiority broadly and granting certification). 
 14.  Compare, e.g., Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(allowing certification), with, e.g., Rowden v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 587 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (noting that in this case “it is simply not credible to argue that a class action is the ‘superior’ 
method”). 
 15.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997). 
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options.16 Still other courts decide superiority based on the individual 
amount at issue,17 while others focus on the wealth of the plaintiffs.18 
Additionally troubling are the judicial interpretations of 
superiority that foreclose class actions for small sum cases.19 These 
cases are essential for private enforcement of consumer protection laws, 
ranging from the Sherman Act, to Truth in Lending, to consumer 
product defect and mislabeling claims.20 Yet as a practical matter, few 
litigants have the financial wherewithal to bring individual suits, and 
often such cases are not worth the cost it takes to bring them.21 
Given that significant and pervasive problems stem, in part, 
from Congress’s mandate of “case-by-case experimentation,”22 this 
Article argues the superiority experiment failed. Part I starts with the 
origin of superiority. Then, relying on over three hundred federal 
decisions, it summarizes the judicial inconsistency applying the 
requirement. Part II explores why this disagreement exists. It explains 
how courts’ unfettered discretion allows them to define superiority by 
selecting from three conflicting policy goals—resulting in radically 
divergent interpretations. Part III proposes to cure the inferiority of 
superiority by eliminating the requirement. 
I. SUPERIORITY: ORIGIN AND CHAOS 
The superiority requirement was enacted as part of Congress’s 
attempt to clarify and create more predictable class action decisions. 
The original 1933 version of Rule 23 “mean[t] different things to 
 
 16.  Compare In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 2011) (defining 
superiority to consider solely adjudicatory alternatives, not private recall efforts), and In re 
Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 293 F.R.D. 21, 34–35 (D. Me. 2013) (same), 
with Daigle v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. No. 09-3214 (MJD/LIB), 2012 WL 3113854, at *6 (D. Minn. 
July 31, 2012) (defining superiority to consider defendant’s administrative private recall). 
 17.  Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 416 (5th Cir. 2001), withdrawn, 281 F.3d 477 (5th 
Cir. 2002). 
 18.  Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
July 6, 2011). 
 19.  Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[H]eightened 
ascertainability . . . gives one factor in the balance absolute priority, with the effect of barring class 
actions where class treatment is often most needed: in cases involving relatively low-cost goods or 
services . . . .”). 
 20.  See Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641 (2012). 
 21.  Statement on Behalf of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules 7 (1965) [hereinafter 
Statement]. 
 22.  See Completion Notes, supra note 7. 
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different persons.”23 In 1966, the Rule 23 Subcommittee, a division of 
the Civil Rules Committee, sought to remedy this uncertainty.24 The 
Committee saw an “insistent demand and need” for class actions,25 
recognizing that without such mechanisms “access to the courts may be 
put out of reach for those whose individual stakes are low or who by 
reason of poverty or ignorance will not go it alone.”26 The Rule 23 
amendments were enacted in response to this demand, outlining the 
criteria making a claim eligible for class certification; however, rather 
than clarifying, superiority has confused the certification inquiry. This 
Part details how. It first identifies deficiencies with the requirement’s 
statutory language and legislative history then shows how they fuel 
judicial dissonance. 
A. The Superiority Requirement 
The 1966 Amendment created Rule 23(a), a set of prerequisites 
for all class actions.27 Once met, the class must satisfy one of three 
distinct categories set out in Rule 23(b). A (b)(3) class, the most common 
category for certification and the only one at issue in this Article, 
permits monetary damages. Rule 23(b)(3) has only two requirements: 
predominance and superiority.28 Predominance means “the questions of 
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members.”29 This is the primary battleground 
for certification decisions. Consequently, and perhaps not surprisingly, 
 
 23.  Charles W. Joiner, Rule 23 Subcommittee Member, Proposed Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—A Step Forward at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Judicial 
Conference Third Judicial Circuit of the United States (Sept. 12, 1964) (transcript on file with 
author). 
 24.  Statement, supra note 21, at 7. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). These are (1) numerosity (a “class [so large] that joinder of all 
members is impracticable”), (2) commonality (“questions of law or fact common to the class”), (3) 
typicality (named parties’ claims or defenses “are typical . . . of the class”), and (4) adequacy of 
representation (named plaintiffs and class counsel “will fairly and adequately protect the interests 
of the class”). Id. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See id. 
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scholars30 and the Supreme Court31 have actively shaped the contours 
of the predominance requirement. Additionally, every circuit court has 
weighed in to clarify predominance.32 
Superiority is the oft-overlooked sibling of predominance. For 
superiority, the court must find “that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.”33 Like predominance, this requirement is reviewed solely 
for abuses of discretion.34 However, unlike predominance, little 
scholarship comprehensively discusses superiority,35 and Supreme 
Court guidance is scant. While the Roberts Court has actively reviewed 
class actions, those decisions address issues other than superiority.36 
 
 30.  See, e.g., Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 751, 751 
(2012); Alex Parkinson, Comcast Corp v. Behrend and Chaos on the Ground, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1213 (2014); Ryan Patrick Phair, Resolving the “Choice-of-Law Problem” in Rule 23(b)(3) 
Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 862 (2000). 
 31.  See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196–97 (2013); 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013). 
 32.  See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2015); EQT Prod. Co. v. 
Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 366 (4th Cir. 2014); In re Johnson, 760 F.3d  66, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Abdullah 
v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2013); Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 814 
(7th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2009); In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay 
LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 535 (6th 
Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2008); Monreal v. Potter, 
367 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 33.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 34.  See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 
283, 316 (3d Cir. 1998); Muzuco v. Re$ubmitIt, LLC, 297 F.R.D. 504, 521 (S.D. Fla. 2013). 
 35.  To date, class action scholars have focused narrowly on isolated superiority questions. 
See, e.g., Michael P. Murtagh, The Rule 23(b)(3) Superiority Requirement and Transnational Class 
Actions: Excluding Foreign Class Members in Favor of European Remedies, 34 HASTINGS INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (focusing narrowly on transnational class actions); Andrea Joy Parker, 
Dare to Compare: Determining What “Other Available Methods” Can Be Considered Under Federal 
Rule 23(b)(3)’s Superiority Requirement, 44 GA. L. REV. 581, 583 (2010) (addressing superiority’s 
alternative methods of adjudication language); Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf Is Predominant and 
Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(a), 2002 UTAH L. 
REV. 249, 250 (discussing how the superiority analysis applies in more rare issue, not damages, 
class actions). This Article is the first to undertake a comprehensive analysis of judicial 
interpretations for each of the five aspects of the superiority requirement.  
 36.  See, e.g., Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 666 (2016) (discussing effect of 
class action settlement); Amgen Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 1188 (predominance); AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (class action arbitration waivers); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 360 (2011) ((b)(2) classes). The only recent mention of superiority was in 
dicta. See Dukes, 564 U.S. at 363 (noting cryptically that in monetary class actions superiority is 
not “self-evident” with respect to each class member’s individualized claim for money). 
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Rule 23(b)(3) does not define superiority. Instead, courts 
consider five factors. The first, “alternative methods,” considers “other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.”37 The remaining four are from Rule 23(b)(3)(A)–(D): 
(b)(3)(A) the individuals’ interests, (B) pending litigation, (C) forum, 
and (D) manageability.38 This Section provides a rough primer, showing 
how each factor generates more questions. 
Superiority decisions frequently begin with the “alternative 
methods” analysis.39 The text of the statute and Committee Notes 
support comparing a class action to individual methods of “adjudicating 
the controversy.”40 Nonetheless, some courts consider non-litigation 
alternatives.41 Further, neither the rule nor legislative history explains 
how superior a class action must be to available alternatives. 
The four enumerated factors trigger more conflict. For 
“individuals’ interests,” courts consider “the class members’ interests in 
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate 
actions.”42 While acknowledging such interests are minimal in cases 
involving “small” amounts of recovery, the Comments direct courts to 
consider individuals’ interests in “carrying [their own litigation] on as 
they see fit.”43 The Comments offer no further guidance on what 
constitutes a “small amount” or the tipping point for when such 
interests preclude certification. They then blur the distinction between 
predominance and the individuals’ interest analysis, noting these 
interests may be “theoretical rather than practical” in cases with “a 
high degree of cohesion.”44 Hence, what types of individuals’ interests 
should be considered—separate and apart from predominance—are 
 
 37.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 38.  Id. at (b)(3)(A)–(D). 
 39.  Id. at (b)(3). 
 40.  Id. (“[A] class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently 
adjudicating the controversy.” (emphasis added)); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee notes 
to 1966 amendments (“[A]nother method of handling the litigious situation may be available which 
has greater practical advantages. Thus one or more actions agreed to by the parties as test or 
model actions may be preferable to a class action; or it may prove feasible and preferable to 
consolidate actions.”); see also In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“It is not as if the Supreme Court and other participants in the rulemaking process . . . used the 
word ‘adjudication’ loosely to mean all ways to redress injuries.”). 
 41.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 42.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A). 
 43.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee notes to 1966 amendments. 
 44.  See id. 
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unclear.45 In application, courts consider a range of differing interests, 
from the amount in controversy to the wealth of individual class 
members. 
The pending litigation factor’s focus is two-fold and considers: (1) 
the “extent” of pending litigation and (2) the “nature” of such 
litigation.46 For extent, the Comments state, “[T]he court should inform 
itself of any litigation actually pending by or against the individuals,”47 
but do not explain how that information affects certification. Similarly, 
for nature the Comments solely note: “Also pertinent is the question of 
the desirability of concentrating the trial of the claims in the particular 
forum by means of a class action, in contrast to allowing the claims to 
be litigated separately in forums to which they would ordinarily be 
brought.”48 
Rule 23(b)(3)(C) switches the focus from pending litigation to the 
appropriate forum.49 Courts consider “the desirability or undesirability 
of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum.”50 
This forum factor invites a comparative analysis between the 
advantages of the pending forum and other courts where individual 
claims could be brought.51 The purpose of this factor and the degree of 
comparative advantage needed is unstated. 
The last factor in Rule 23(b)(3) is manageability, whereby courts 
consider “the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of 
a class action.”52 This is the only aspect of superiority the Supreme 
Court has addressed—though giving the topic short shrift. In Amchem 
v. Windsor, the Court held that a settlement class need not satisfy 
manageability, though the Court never addressed the other superiority 
factors.53 Even for manageability, though, Amchem leaves many 
unanswered questions. There are frequently “likely difficulties in 
managing a class action,”54 begging the question at what point do such 
difficulties tip the scale towards denying an otherwise viable class 
 
 45.  For example, the Committee Notes cite an essay by Professor Chaffee. The relevant pages 
discuss the challenges individualized issues pose to aggregate litigation—issues squarely relevant 
to predominance. ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 274 (1950).  
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Comment to FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(C). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See id. 
 52.  Id. at (b)(3)(D). 
 53.  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997). 
 54.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
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claim? Further, which difficulties count?55 Should choice of law issues 
matter? What about the potential disproportionality of damages to 
harm or the challenges identifying potential class members (what some 
courts call ascertainability)?56 
This general background only unmasks a fraction of the 
problems with defining superiority. The next Section delves more 
deeply into jurisprudence, exploring the judicial strife in answering the 
questions left by the superiority requirement’s text and legislative 
history. 
B. The Sordid Superiority Landscape 
After enactment, the Subcommittee imposed a thirty-year 
moratorium on revising class action rules.57 During that period, courts 
were left to sort out superiority. As detailed below, it was not long before 
they adopted different, often inconsistent, positions. These 
disagreements transcend simple factor-by-factor, temporal, or 
geographic groupings.58 Instead, a cleaner approach is to group the 
jurisprudence as splits regarding: (1) financial considerations, (2) 
litigation options, and (3) judicial economy. 
1. Money and Superiority 
With money comes disagreement. As courts decide superiority, 
financial considerations generate the first area of judicial dissonance. 
Primarily, judges wrestle with the potential recovery by individuals and 
total payouts by defendants. Though not expressly mentioned in the 
requirement, judges import these issues into both individuals’ interests 
under Rule 23(b)(3)(A) and manageability under Rule 23(B)(3)(D). 
To begin, courts differ on whether the amount at stake should 
decide the individuals’ interests factor. For some courts, individual 
financial gain is irrelevant: “the mere fact that claims could be asserted 
 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See infra Part I.B.2. 
 57.  See CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 509 (5th ed. 1994); Back to 
the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class Action and the Limits of Rule 23, 109 HARV. L. REV. 828, 
845 (1996). 
 58.  Even in the same circuit, courts adopt notably different superiority analyses. Compare, 
e.g., Xavier v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (defining 
superiority narrowly), with, e.g., Ortega v. Nat. Balance, Inc., 300 F.R.D. 422, 426 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(defining superiority broadly). 
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independently is not a reason to defeat class certification.”59 These 
courts focus on collective action gains—such as avoiding disparate 
results and sharing litigation costs.60 These gains outweigh individuals’ 
interests, particularly given opt-out procedures.61 
Other courts consider the amount at stake. These courts 
repeatedly acknowledge that small individual claims support 
certification62 but reach sharply opposing conclusions about what 
counts as “small.”63 Some courts hold thousands of dollars in individual 
gross recovery are still best handled through class actions.64 The 
question there shifts from whether the amount at issue is small to 
whether it is “not large.”65 These courts presume certification promotes 
an individual’s interests and require some affirmative showing to the 
contrary to deny certification on superiority grounds.66 For other courts, 
 
 59.  Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 296 F.R.D. 261, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Fort Worth 
Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 301 F.R.D. 116, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (same). 
 60.  Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1988) (“The procedural 
device of a Rule 23(b)(3) class action was designed not solely as a means for assuring legal 
assistance in the vindication of small claims but, rather, to achieve the economies of time, effort, 
and expense.”); see also Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff’d 
without opinion, 507 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1975); Buford v. Am. Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1250 
(N.D. Ga. 1971). 
 61.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A). 
 62.  Wolin v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010); Pastor v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 487 F.3d 1042, 1047 (7th Cir. 2007); Herkert v. MRC Receivables 
Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 353 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“The policy at the very core of the class action 
mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any 
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.” (internal citation omitted)); see also 
Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 512 (1987) (“The 
desire of individual class members to control their own suits carries little weight in class actions 
involving small amounts of money.”).   
 63.  Class actions involving statutory caps are similarly split. Compare, e.g., Jones v. CBE 
Grp., Inc., 215 F.R.D. 558, 570 (D. Minn. 2003) (lacking superiority because of the de minimis 
amount involved), with, e.g., Warcholek v. Med. Collection Sys., Inc., 241 F.R.D. 291, 295–96 (N.D. 
Ill. 2006) (finding superiority despite a damages cap that meant de minimis individual recovery). 
 64.  See, e.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC, 244 F.R.D. 469, 480–81 (N.D. Ill. 2007), aff’d, 
571 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2009) (granting certification of a class where class representatives had 
claims worth millions); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(certifying action involving six-figure and million-dollar recoveries); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of 
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450 (D.N.J. 1997) (tens and hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in individual damages). 
 65.  “Not large” individual damage amounts support superiority. See, e.g., Zinser v. Accufix 
Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir. 2001); In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982) (abrogated on other grounds by Valentino v. 
Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996)).  
 66.  See, e.g., Michaud v. Monro Muffler Brake, Inc., No. 2:12-cv-00353-NT, 2015 WL 
1206490, at *5 (D. Me. Mar. 17, 2015) (finding superiority satisfied because class members have 
not indicated “an interest in bringing separate actions”). 
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only net-zero cases—where the cost of individual litigation exceeds the 
potential recovery—justify certification.67 
Courts further splinter on the individuals’ interests factor in 
claims involving mixed financial stakes. If a few class members’ 
potential recoveries are large—even if the majority of the class’s 
individual recoveries would be net-zero—some courts deny superiority. 
For example, in Walter v. Hughes, the Northern District of California 
denied certification for a class that alleged an Internet provider 
misrepresented download speeds.68 In finding a lack of superiority, the 
court summarily concluded that while, “it is true that the settlement 
contemplates awards of $5 and $40 to class members . . . , the named 
Plaintiffs seek $5,000, a considerably higher amount [suggesting] the 
class’s claims may be large enough to justify individual actions.”69 
Other courts take a contrary position on the individuals’ interest 
factor. For example, the Southern District of New York found 
superiority in a putative class action where some but not all class 
members’ recoveries would be significant.70 The court explained, 
“[Plaintiff] has demonstrated that the small-size investments of some 
members of the Proposed Class would make individualized lawsuits 
impracticable for those investors.”71 
Whether to consider class members’ personal wealth further 
divides courts. Some presume interest in individual suit when class 
members could potentially afford litigation.72 Other courts reject class 
members’ wealth as irrelevant. As one court explains, “Rule 23 has no 
restriction on wealth.”73 Consequently, the individuals’ interests factor 
leads to contrary superiority findings, even in analogous cases.74 
 
 67.  Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 263 F.3d 394, 416 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding the absence of a negative 
value suit “a significant detraction from the superiority of the class action device”), withdrawn, 
281 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2002). Other courts take an even more extreme stance. For example, in 
Berther v. TSYS Total Debt Management, the Eastern District of Wisconsin found a lack of 
superiority in a case involving a mere $1,000 recovery per class member. No. 06-C-293, 2007 WL 
1795472, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2007) (“[T]he court finds no reason to conclude that a maximum 
of $1,000 would be insufficient to motivate an individual plaintiff to pursue private litigation.”).   
 68.  Walter v. Hughes Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-2136 SC, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 
July 6, 2011). 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Dodona I, LLC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 296 F.R.D. 261, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 71.  See id. 
 72.  Walter, 2011 WL 2650711, at *10. 
 73.  In re Revco Sec. Litig., 142 F.R.D. 659, 669 (N.D. Ohio 1978). 
 74.  Compare In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1334, 
*3 (D. Ariz. 1979) (finding superiority in part because the price-fixing claim would benefit the 
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Different takes on potential financial recovery also cloud the 
manageability analysis under Rule 23(b)(3)(D). Shifting from class 
members’ recovery to the defendant’s potential payout, some courts use 
manageability to weigh the proportionality of statutory damages 
against the actual harm suffered.75 Though neither the legislative 
history nor the text of the rule supports this analysis, it often arises in 
consumer protection cases involving statutory damages, such as the 
Truth in Lending Act’s one hundred dollar fine per violation. In a class 
action, the per-person fine would be aggregated across the class up to a 
cap. Given the large potential exposure, some courts use superiority to 
screen out such claims.76 For example, in Ratner v. Chemical Bank of 
New York Trust Co.,77 the Southern District of New York denied class 
certification. It was undisputed the defendant in the case violated 
statutory law by failing to disclose the annual percentage rate on 
outstanding credit card account balances for approximately 130,000 
clients.78 Regardless, the court held a class action was not superior to 
individual lawsuits because of the large exposure the defendant faced 
for its admitted wrongdoing.79 
In contrast, other courts reject proportionality arguments as 
outside the manageability evaluation.80 They view Rule 23 simply as a 
procedural device, one that does not alter congressional intent.81 These 
 
public at large), with In re Transit Co. Tire Antitrust Litig., 67 F.R.D. 59, 76 (W.D. Mo. 1975) 
(denying superiority due to how time consuming the price-fixing litigation would be). 
 75.  See, e.g., Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 776 (3d Cir. 1974); Ratner v. Chem. 
Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); see also David B. Farkas, Out of Proportion, 
L.A. LAW., Sept. 2014, at 34 (“Judicial response to this issue in such cases has been anything but 
uniform.”).   
 76.  See, e.g., Evans v. U-Haul Co. of Cal., No. CV 07-2097-JFW (JCx), 2007 WL 7648595, at 
*7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2007) (“[P]otential for abuse is [one] reason why maintenance of a class 
action is not superior . . . in cases . . . where there is an enormous contrast between the huge 
liability suffered by Defendant and the lack of harm suffered by Plaintiff.”). 
 77.  54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 78.  See id. at 413–14. 
 79.  See id. at 416. 
 80.  Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2010); Murray v. GMAC 
Mortg. Corp., 434 F. 3d 948, 953–54 (7th Cir. 2006). 
 81.  United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 680 (1985); Murray, 434 F.3d at 954 (“[I]t is not 
appropriate to use procedural devices to undermine laws of which a judge disapproves.” (citation 
omitted)); Jaskolski v. Daniels, 427 F.3d 456, 461–64 (7th Cir. 2005). Instead, these courts consider 
proportionality after a full evaluation of the defendant’s conduct. See, e.g., Holloway v. Full 
Spectrum Lending, No. CV 06-5975 DOC (RNBx), 2007 WL 7698843, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 
2007) (“Any constitutional infirmity stemming from a disparity between the actual harm and the 
amount of damages awarded is properly addressed if, and when, damages are awarded.”); see also 
Parker v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., L.P., 331 F.3d 13, 22 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t may be that in a 
sufficiently serious case the due process clause might be invoked, not to prevent certification, but 
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courts reason that if Congress wanted to prohibit class actions, it would 
have either articulated such a prohibition in the statute or capped 
aggregate claims.82 
This discord over financial considerations means superiority 
depends on the judge. This inconsistency grows over questions of 
litigant choice. 
2. Litigation Options and Superiority 
Superiority jurisprudence is further divided on how much to 
preserve diverse redress options for absent class members. 
Representative litigation necessarily compromises an individual’s 
ability to control the adjudication of his legal rights.83 Neither the 
history nor the text of superiority offers guidance on weighing a 
theoretical interest in control against the benefits of collective suit.84 
Struggles to find this balance splinter superiority’s manageability and 
alternative methods analyses. 
To begin, judicial concerns about adjudicating individuals’ legal 
rights without their affirmative assent complicate the manageability 
factor. Some courts impose an “ascertainability” requirement onto 
manageability, though the term itself does not appear in Rule 
23(b)(3)(D).85 Ascertainability’s meaning radically varies, with judges 
adopting contrary positions regarding what this assessment covers86 
 
to nullify that effect and reduce the aggregate damage award. . . . At this point in this case, 
however, these concerns remain hypothetical.”). 
 82.  See, e.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(B)(ii) (2012) (total 
recovery may not exceed “the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the 
[defendant]”); Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012) (same). 
 83.  See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Richard A. Nagareda, Class Settlements Under Attack, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1654 (2008) (discussing autonomy issues in class actions). But see Joshua 
P. Davis et al., The Puzzle of Class Actions with Uninjured Members, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 858, 
870 (2014) (discussing how class actions promote autonomy by “putting in place the result that 
class members would be apt to choose”). 
 84.   FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (stating courts would 
“consider the interests of individual members of the class in controlling their own litigations and 
carrying them on as they see fit”); see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 
391 (1967) (“will and ability to take care of himself”).   
 85.  See Erin L. Geller, The Fail-Safe Class as an Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2778 (2013) (discussing this implicit requirement). 
 86.  Stephanie Haas, Class Is in Session: The Third Circuit Heightens Ascertainability with 
Rigor in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 59 VILL. L. REV. 793, 804 (2014) (describing ascertainability’s 
“malleable” nature). 
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and how ascertainable class members need to be.87 Ascertainability has 
assumed three meanings: (1) identifying class members “using objective 
criteria; (2) capturing all members necessary to resolve the action in a 
single proceeding; and (3) describing the main claims and defenses that 
apply to the class.”88 However, proof of class membership may be 
difficult to come by. Consumer cases are common examples, as class 
members may not retain proof of purchase, such as receipts. 
Despite this difficulty, many courts treat administrative 
problems identifying class members as insurmountable,89 while others 
grant certification. Preserving class members’ potential options is less 
important to these latter courts. They either reject the ascertainability 
requirement or reframe the inquiry slightly: so long as the class 
definition is sufficiently clear to identify affected individuals, a class is 
ascertainable.90 According to these courts, a contrary interpretation 
would mean “there would be no such thing as a consumer class action.”91 
 
 87.  Ascertainability concerns first appeared in the 1980s. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 670 
(7th Cir. 1981); see also Daniel Luks, Ascertainability in the Third Circuit: Name That Class 
Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2388–93 (2014) (discussing the policy considerations behind 
this split). 
 88.  Haas, supra note 86, at 804. 
 89.  See, e.g., Stewart v. Beam Glob. Spirits & Wine, Inc., No. 11-5149 (NLH/KMW), 2014 WL 
2920806, at *7 (D.N.J. June 27, 2014) (noting, in a suit alleging deceptive marking claims against 
the producers of Skinnygirl Margarita mix, that putative class members would almost certainly 
be incapable of recalling the details of every purchase, the price of purchases, or frequencies of 
purchases without relying on speculation); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(noting that conducting “mini-trials” to ensure that every class member purchased WeightSmart 
dietary supplement would not be “administratively feasible”); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage 
Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (“Plaintiffs suggest 
that after certification, the Court could require that ‘[c]lass members produce a receipt, offer a 
product label, or even sign a declaration to confirm that the individual had purchased’ a Snapple 
beverage within the class period. This suggestion, to say the least, is unrealistic.”); see also Marcus 
v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining the ascertainability 
requirement eliminates serious administrative burdens by “insisting on the easy identification of 
class members”). 
 90.  See, e.g., McCrary v. Elations Co., No. EDCV 13–00242 JGB (OPx), 2014 WL 1779243, 
at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (“[I]t is enough that the class definition describes a ‘set of common 
characteristics sufficient to allow’ a prospective plaintiff ‘to identify himself or herself as having a 
right to recover based on the description.’ ”); Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 
2013) (noting that it would be an insurmountable hurdle to consumer class action if class actions 
could be defeated at the class certification stage simply because membership is difficult to 
ascertain); see also Kinder v. Dearborn Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 10-12570, 2011 WL 6371184, at *4 
(E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2011) (“Due process does not . . . require actual notice to each party . . . .”). 
 91.  Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 2012). Courts adopting 
this position also cite concerns about incentivizing defendants to limit recordkeeping. See, e.g., 
Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 302 F.R.D. 240, 250 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (“[D]eclining to 
certify a class altogether, as defendants propose—would create an incentive for a person to violate 
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Similarly, potential redress options also muddle analyses of 
“available methods for . . . adjudicating the controversy.”92 Whether 
alternative methods include arbitration or other private compensation 
schemes depends on the judge.93 Courts that see these alternatives as 
superior prefer individualized decisionmaking,94 even when such 
alternatives provide lesser relief than a class claim. For example, in a 
recent putative class action against Ford for a defective torque 
converter, the District Court of Minnesota denied superiority, instead 
finding Ford’s voluntary refund program sufficient.95 The court openly 
acknowledged “that certain class members will not be fully reimbursed 
through the recall” as some class members paid for a full transmission, 
but the refund only covered the cost of a converter.96 
At the same time, other courts treat refund programs and other 
private compensation schemes as outside the superiority analysis.97 
These courts strictly abide by the “adjudicative” language in the 
statute98 and recognize that the existence of other options does not 
trump private rights of action.99 
 
the TCPA on a mass scale and keep no records of its activity, knowing that it could avoid legal 
responsibility for the full scope of its illegal conduct.”). 
 92.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 93.  Compare In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 699–701 (N.D. 
Ga. 2008) (finding refund for contaminated peanut butter a superior form of resolution), with 
Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 610 (E.D. La. 2006) (“The analysis is whether the 
class action format is superior to other methods of adjudication, not whether a class action is 
superior to an out-of-court, private settlement program.”). 
 94.  See, e.g., ConAgra, 251 F.R.D. at 699–700; In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 214 F.R.D. 614, 621–22 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (“To this day, defendants maintain refund and 
product replacement programs for individuals . . . . It makes little sense to certify a class where a 
class mechanism is unnecessary to afford the class members redress.”). 
 95.  Daigle v. Ford Motor Co., Civ. No. 09-3214 (MJD/LIB), 2012 WL 3113854, at *6 (D. Minn. 
July 31, 2012). 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  As one court explains, such programs require comparing the gains of a class action to 
such private options—a kind of “abstract economic choice analysis” precluded by the text of the 
rule and supporting legislative history. In re Hannaford Bros. Co. Customer Data Sec. Breach 
Litig., 293 F.R.D. 21, 34–35 (D. Me. 2013). To these courts, a contrary interpretation undermines 
the collective gains of classwide resolution. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 
910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 920 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 
(5th Cir. 2014) (rejecting the relevance of a private settlement fund, as it would “bar the possibility 
of any class-wide settlement”). For more on the problems with voluntary refunds, see generally 
Anita Bernstein, Voluntary Recalls, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359, 390–96. 
 98.  See Parker, supra note 35, at 599–600 (discussing how a textual reading supports 
focusing solely on adjudicative alternatives). 
 99.  See, e.g., White v. E-Loan, Inc., No. C 05-02080 SI, 2006 WL 2411420, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 18, 2006) (rejecting the argument that FTC enforcement would be superior to the putative 
class action); see also Amalgamated Workers Union v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 478 F.2d 540, 543 (3d 
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Thus, similar to financial concerns, how much to protect 
litigants’ options clouds superiority. Instead of systematic, predictable 
interpretations, courts draw contrary conclusions based on judicial 
preference. 
3. Judicial Economy and Superiority 
A third divide in superiority jurisprudence forms around 
defining judicial economy, namely when certifying a class action 
achieves “economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote[s], 
uniformity of decision . . . without . . . bringing about other undesirable 
results.”100 Broadly construed, concerns about judicial economy 
threaten to preclude any class action, given such cases inherently use 
significant judicial resources. Delineating when to expend such 
resources impacts both the manageability and the pending litigation 
factors.101 
First, as previously discussed, the manageability factor directs 
courts to consider “the likely difficulties in managing a class action.”102 
Courts inconsistently calibrate the amount of difficulty they are willing 
to tolerate.103 As Allan Erbsen notes, “Absent some principled guidance 
for determining whether a management device is substantively 
acceptable—which Rule 23 currently does not provide—analysis of 
manageability is as likely to create problems as it is to prevent them.”104 
For example, courts differ greatly on choice of law challenges. In 
cases with class members from multiple states, courts must identify the 
governing law.105 While the predominance requirement addresses 
 
Cir. 1973) (“As we view it, it would appear that [Rule 23(b)(3)] was not intended to weigh the 
superiority of a class action against possible administrative relief.”). 
 100.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 101.  Differing views on judicial economy also impact how courts define non-adjudicative 
alternatives. See, e.g., Patton v. Topps Meat Co., No. 07-CV-00654(S)(M), 2010 WL 9432381, at *10 
(W.D.N.Y. May 27, 2010); Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398–99 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 102.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D). 
 103.  See, e.g., Bertulli v. Indep. Ass’n of Cont’l Pilots, 242 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2001); Mullen 
v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 630–31 (5th Cir. 1999) (Garza, J., dissenting) 
(analyzing the district court’s failure “to consider the difficulties posed by the 
plaintiffs’ . . . allegations”); Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting 
judges’ reliance on “Rule 23(c)(4)(A)’s severance procedure to structure unwieldy class action 
lawsuits”). 
 104.  Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to Regulating 
Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 1070 (2005). 
 105.  The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 pushed more nationwide classes into federal courts 
without addressing the resulting choice of law issues. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); see also Elizabeth 
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choice of law, some courts revisit it under manageability. For some, 
claims involving the laws of multiple states automatically make a class 
unmanageable.106 Other courts recognize class actions are necessarily 
challenging, so manageability “will rarely, if ever, be in itself sufficient 
to prevent certification of a class.”107 These courts use case management 
tools (subclassing, phased trials, bifurcation, or statistical sampling) or 
adopt choice of law approaches that minimize manageability concerns 
(such as an “interest analysis” or applying the law of the defendant’s 
home state).108 Often this broader definition of manageability is a 
 
Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 674 (2013); Miller, supra note 5, at 
299. 
 106.  See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“Because these claims must be adjudicated under the law of so many jurisdictions, 
a single nationwide class is not manageable.”); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 674 
(7th Cir. 2001) (discussing how a nationwide case presents manageability concerns); Lichoff v. CSX 
Transp., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 564, 574 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (noting application of six states’ laws “would 
make it burdensome to instruct a jury on the legal standards for plaintiffs’ claims”); see also James 
E. Pfander, The Substance and Procedure of Class Action Reform, 93 ILL. B.J. 144 
(2005) (suggesting the prospect of differing state substantive laws “often persuades federal judges 
to reject nationwide class treatment as unwieldy”). 
 107.  Klay v Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004); see also In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 140 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting “failure to certify an 
action under Rule 23(b)(3) on the sole ground that it would be unmanageable is disfavored”); Glen 
v. Fairway Indep. Mortg. Corp., 265 F.R.D. 474, 482 (E.D. Mo. 2010) (stating that “ ‘dismissal for 
management reasons is never favored’ because class actions are meant ‘to permit plaintiffs with 
small claims and little money to pursue a claim otherwise unavailable.’ ” (quoting In re Workers’ 
Comp., 130 F.R.D. 99, 110 (D. Minn. 1990))); DeLoach v. Philip Morris Cos., 206 F.R.D. 551, 567 
(M.D.N.C. 2002) (“Though any case of such magnitude certainly poses problems of 
manageability . . . . dismissal for management reasons, in view of the public interest involved in 
class actions, should be the exception rather than the rule.” (internal citations and quotations 
omitted)). 
 108.  See, e.g., In re Nigeria Charter Flights Contract Litig., 233 F.R.D. 297, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 
2006) (discussing how differences in state law “should not deter certification of a class”); Simon v. 
Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (discussing courts use of subclasses and 
uniformity of state law in class actions); Graham v. Knutson Mortg. Corp., No. CT 94-11043, 1996 
WL 407491, at *6 (D. Minn. June 18, 1996) (stating that applying the laws of various states would 
not be “a particularly unmanageable task”); see also Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for 
Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 220 (1998) (“A thoughtful, reasoned analysis . . . could 
legitimately result in applying the law of the defendants’ home state to determine liability for 
conduct-based claims . . . .”); Luke McCloud & David Rosenberg, A Solution to the Choice of Law 
Problem of Differing State Laws in Class Actions: Average Law, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 374, 394 
(2011) (arguing that the “use of average law . . . replicates the functional consequences and effects 
that would be obtained under the benchmark process of applying the differing laws separately, 
state by state”). For a thorough discussion of these different methods, see Edward F. Sherman, 
Segmenting Aggregate Litigation: Initiatives and Impediments for Reshaping the Trial Process, 25 
REV. LITIG. 691 (2006). 
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comparative one.109 As the Eleventh Circuit states, “[W]e are not 
assessing whether this class action will create significant management 
problems, but instead determining whether it will create relatively 
more management problems than any of the alternatives.”110 
Depending on the approach, the outcome of certification differs 
greatly. Take, for example, two notably similar antitrust cases, one in 
Tennessee and one in Florida.111 Both involved state antitrust law 
claims. Both involved allegations of unlawful interference with the 
entry of a generic drug. Both were brought by indirect purchasers with 
multistate claims. In the Tennessee case, the court denied certification, 
holding a nationwide case would require application of the law of 
multiple states, thus “render[ing] this class simply unmanageable.”112 
In the Florida case, though, the court granted certification, noting the 
variation “does not pose a manageability problem because the 
applicable substantive laws are virtually identical in their required 
elements.”113 
Different line-drawing regarding judicial economy also plagues 
the pending litigation factor.114 While some courts only consider 
pending class actions that have not been consolidated,115 others adopt a 
more granular approach, analyzing the status of the pending litigation. 
In these courts, only advanced litigation or those that adversely affect 
the pending case are relevant.116 In direct conflict, other courts require 
 
 109.  See, e.g., 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4.32, at 
279 (4th ed. 2014) (“Rule 23(b)(3) permits a class denial for lack of superiority only when other 
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy actual exist.”). 
 110.  Klay, 382 F.3d at 1273. 
 111.  In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555 (E.D. Tenn. 2014); United 
Wis. Servs. v. Abbott Labs. (In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 220 F.R.D. 672 (S.D. 
Fla. 2004). 
 112.  See Metaxalone, 299 F.R.D. at 588. 
 113.  Terazosin, 220 F.R.D. at 700 n.45. 
 114.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(B) (requiring judges to make certification determinations on 
“the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already begun by or against 
class members”). 
 115.  See Williams v. Lane, 96 F.R.D. 383, 385 (N.D. Ill. 1982). One court has gone further to 
only consider cases involving the same parties. Rosales v. El Rancho Farms, No. 1:09-cv-00707-
AWI-JLT, 2012 WL 3763955, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2012) (“Though there are related actions 
pending, the parties have not identified any other actions involving the parties in this case.”). 
 116.  See, e.g., Lopez v. Orlor, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 35, 41 (D. Conn. 1997) (finding superiority 
despite the existence of one other case and a companion state case because “[c]ertification here will 
not adversely affect these related cases”). This analysis looks at various factors, such as claims 
implicated, if the other litigation is also a putative class, and the status of any other litigation. See, 
e.g., Parra v. Bashas’, Inc., 291 F.R.D. 360, 396 (D. Ariz. 2013) (finding superiority despite pending 
EEOC claim for overlapping discriminatory misconduct because the EEOC case was in its infancy). 
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existing cases to ensure certification of the proposed class does not 
merely serve to create “lawsuits where none previously existed.”117 Still 
others require not just existing cases, but also prior tried class actions. 
Under this line of authority, for so-called “novel claims,”118 the lack of 
similar prior litigation precludes superiority because of judicial 
economy concerns.119 As one court stated: 
If there existed a prior track record of trials in these types of cases, the Court would be 
able to make a more accurate determination as to judicial efficiency. The Court could refer 
to the actual issues and problems that arise in these cases, instead of being forced to 
speculate as to what these issues and problems may be. Additionally, individual trials in 
these cases may winnow out many of the individual issues that are now before this Court. 
After individual trials are conducted in these cases, the courts will have the necessary 
information to make a thoughtful and logical superiority determination. At this time, 
however, plaintiffs cannot produce enough information to establish the superiority of a 
class action.120 
Initially, this interpretation existed only in mass tort, but it has crept 
into other substantive areas.121 In this creep, it is particularly difficult 
to reconcile courts’ differing approaches. For example, Carpenter v. 
BMW involved alleged misrepresentations regarding certain models’ 
 
 117.  Berley v. Dreyfus & Co., 43 F.R.D. 397, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 118.  This approach is sometimes called the immature tort theory. See, e.g., Laura J. Hines, 
The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 579 (2004); William N. Reed & 
Bradley W. Smith, HMO Class Actions: How to Kill a Gnat with a Howitzer, 69 MISS. L.J. 1181, 
1212 (2000). 
 119.  See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[C]ertification of an 
immature tort results in a higher than normal risk that the class action may not be superior to 
individual adjudication.”); Neely v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 1:00-CV-00569, 2001 WL 1090204, at *12 
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 15, 2001); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig., 177 F.R.D. 360, 375 
(E.D. La. 1997) (noting that “[if] the cause of action [is] immature in the sense that there is no real 
track record of resolution of similar claims, [an important question informing analysis is] will it 
create manageability problems”); In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203, 212 (S.D. Oh. 
1996) (“[prior] trials are imperative [for superiority]”). When a claim is no longer “novel” is unclear. 
As one scholar explains, “[N]o objective reference exists by which a court can ascertain the number 
of claims necessary to constitute maturity. This indeterminacy will needlessly complicate an 
already intricate inquiry.” Recent Cases, Class Actions—Class Certification of Mass Torts—Fifth 
Circuit Decertifies Nationwide Tobacco Class, 110 HARV. L. REV. 977, 980 (1997). 
 120.  Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 495–96 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (citation omitted). 
 121.  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 192 (3d Cir. 2001), 
(noting in a securities class action that “maturity alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
certification, but it may help to ensure that class certification is ‘superior to individual 
adjudication.’ ”); Crutchfield v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, No. 13-4801, 2014 WL 
346111, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 30, 2014) (finding lack of superiority based on no track record in case 
involving claims of damage from faulty construction). This creep is partly attributable to the 
Manual for Complex Litigation, which implies that some “appellate review of novel legal issues” 
must exist before a court can certify a case with “novel” claims. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 
§ 33.26 n.1057 (3d ed. 1995). 
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transmissions.122 In denying class certification, the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania relied in part on the lack of prior class actions 
adjudicating nationwide misrepresentations.123 Yet, the very same 
year, a few states away, the Northern District of Illinois addressed an 
analogous nationwide class action also for alleged misrepresentations, 
this time involving car wax.124 Without any track record discussion, the 
court granted certification, focusing instead on the lack of other pending 
litigation.125 
Unfortunately, the divides continue in other aspects of the 
analysis, even beyond judicial economy and the prior two categories 
spelled out above.126 As the next Part explains, the reasons for these 
divides show how deeply rooted the problems are with superiority. 
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE SUPERIORITY CONFUSION 
As Part I establishes, with each new superiority question, courts 
reach contrary interpretations. While this background is a precursor to 
rethinking the requirement, any remedy must also consider the sources 
of the strife: namely, why jurisprudence has metastasized into conflict. 
This Part diagnoses what ails the superiority requirement. Some 
conventional answers do not work. For example, the divides do not 
match the amount at stake: even in small sum cases courts disagree.127 
Nor do the divides align by claim. Rather, courts adopt different 
superiority interpretations within a single area of law.128 Political 
 
 122.  Carpenter v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., No. CIV. A. 99-CV-214, 1999 WL 415390, at *1 (E.D. 
Pa. June 21, 1999). 
 123.  See id. at *6–7.  
 124.  Garner v. Healy, 184 F.R.D. 598, 599 (N.D. Ill. 1999). 
 125.  See id. (“[T]here is no evidence that any other actions involving this controversy and 
these parties have been filed elsewhere.”). 
 126.  One such divide occurs in the forum factor, FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(C). Compare Hanlon 
v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding (b)(3)(C) satisfied since “[n]o 
particular forum stands out as a logical venue for concentration of claims”), with Haley v. 
Medtronic, 169 F.R.D. 643, 653 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (“Indeed, plaintiffs have not even established that 
the vast majority of the individual lawsuits that have been filed—or that will be filed—should be 
brought in the [forum].”). 
 127.  Compare, e.g., Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 540–41 (N.D. Cal. 2012) 
(allowing certification), with, e.g., Rowden v. Pac. Parking Sys., Inc., 282 F.R.D. 581, 587 (C.D. Cal. 
2012) (noting that in this case “it is simply not credible to argue that a class action is the ‘superior’ 
method”). 
 128.  Compare, e.g., In re Skelaxin (Metaxalone) Antitrust Litig., 299 F.R.D. 555, 588 (E.D. 
Tenn. 2014) (interpreting superiority using conflict of laws analysis), with, e.g., United Wis. Servs. 
v. Abbott Labs. (In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 220 F.R.D. 672, 700–01 (S.D. Fla. 
2004) (interpreting superiority using manageability analysis). 
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affiliations also fail to explain the divides, as judges appointed by the 
same president diverge.129 
Rather, other causes better account for the fractured superiority 
opinions. First, the requirement lacks sufficient contours to guide 
interpretation, inviting courts to define superiority as they choose. 
Second, the policy goals behind Rule 23(b)(3) conflict, allowing judges 
to reframe the analysis based on their opinions of class actions. Finally, 
one of these policies, efficiency, further splinters interpretations. 
Combined, these attributes go a long away to explain the current chaos 
in superiority jurisprudence. 
A. The Problem with Abdication 
This Section explains how the Rules Committee took an overly 
broad-brush approach to drafting—contrary to its intended goal in 
amending the rule. This abdication of rulemaking responsibility is then 
compounded by decades of minimal judicial review. 
Ideally, superiority would facilitate predictability and 
certainty.130 Rather than different rules for different claims, a 
procedural rule should generally work transsubstantively—applying 
equally regardless of the claims at issue.131 These features minimize 
 
 129.  For example, the Honorable Thomas W. Thrash Jr. and the Honorable Eldon E. Fallon, 
both Clinton appointees, define superiority differently. Compare In re ConAgra Peanut Butter 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 699–700 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (defining alternative methods 
broadly), with Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 610 (E.D. La. 2006) (defining 
alternative methods narrowly). Thus, it is unsurprising that politics do not explain the divides. 
Most of the dissonance is at the district court level. See LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF 
FEDERAL JUDGES 253 (2013) (discussing how political affiliation plays only a “small role at the 
district court level”). 
 130.  See, e.g., CENTRIA v. Alply Architectural Bldg. Sys., LLC, No. 4:11-cv-00079-CWR-LRA, 
2012 WL 73235, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 10, 2012) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exist to 
promote order and predictability in litigation . . . .” (citing Watkins Ludlam Winter & Stennis, P.A. 
v. DynaSteel Corp., No. 3:10-CV-00656-CWR-LRA, 2011 WL 976592, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 17, 
2011))); Yitshak Cohen, Issues Subject to Modification in Family Law: A New Model, 62 DRAKE L. 
REV. 313, 333–34 (2014) (discussing “the general values of civil procedure, such as effectiveness, 
certainty, finality, and predictability”).  
 131.  See, e.g., Ferland v. Conrad Credit Corp., 244 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing 
how procedural rules “take a one-size-fits-all approach”); see also David Marcus, The Past, Present, 
and Future of Trans-Substantivity in Federal Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) 
(describing the principle of trans-substantivity and noting that “[t]he vast majority of the Federal 
Rules are trans-substantive”). 
4-Bartholomew_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2016 4:51 PM 
1316 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:5:1295 
 
arbitrary decisionmaking132 and allow the parties to evaluate ex ante 
the viability of pursuing claims.133 
The 1966 Amendment was meant to serve these functions. 
Frustrated by the inconsistent interpretations riddling earlier class 
action rules, the Rules Committee enacted a revision aimed at more 
predictably shaping the controlled growth of class actions, as mentioned 
in Part I.134 As Arthur Miller, an informal reporter for the Amendment, 
explains: “The Committee had an overarching theme—that the liberal 
joinder of parties and claims was desirable . . . .”135 This is echoed by 
Benjamin Kaplan, the official reporter: “[I]t did not escape attention at 
the time that it would open the way to assertion of many, many claims 
that otherwise would not be pressed; so the rule would stick in the 
throats of establishment defendants.”136 While the Committee debated 
how far to liberalize class action procedures, it recognized the need for 
aggregate litigation. Such joinder advanced access to justice by 
“enabling small people with small claims to vindicate their rights when 
 
 132.  See Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 858 (1984) (“For the skeptics, 
consistency assuages anxiety about arbitrariness. Even if the result is not correct, at least everyone 
is treated the ‘same.’ Consistency promotes equal treatment of individuals, thereby expressing the 
rhetoric of democracy, of ‘equality before the law.’ ”).  
 133.  See Z.W. Julius Chen, Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and 
Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1462–63 (2008) (explaining how predictable 
procedure rules provide the parties “gains from knowing the likely outcome of a potential claim 
because risk can be gauged ex ante, while the lawmaker necessarily intends a specific result when 
he grants a substantive right or promulgates a procedural rule to facilitate the realization of that 
right”); Richard A. Epstein, The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 
311, 313 (1988) (positing that litigation is not filed when clear law makes probable fate of claim 
known). 
 134.  See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 401 (2014) (“The modern American class action rule 
emerged during a period of celebrated liberal legislative initiatives intended to expand the civil 
rights and liberties of ordinary American citizens.”). The motivation for this liberalizing intent has 
long since been debated, with some pointing to private redress goals and others emphasizing larger 
social benefits. Compare Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, 
Reality, and the “Class Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669 (1979) (“[T]he draftsmen 
conceived the procedure’s primary function to be providing a mechanism for securing private 
remedies . . . .”), with Charles Gibbs, Consumer Class Actions After AT&T v. Concepcion: Why the 
Federal Arbitration Act Should Not Be Used to Deny Effective Relief to Small-Value Claimants, 
2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1361 (discussing how the history of the amendment indicates larger 
goals than redress, including deterrence). 
 135.  Miller, supra note 5, at 296 (“Perhaps it was inevitable since those who found themselves 
the object of large-scale class actions aggregating claims that previously were economically 
unviable and facing cases having monetary dimensions that hitherto were unthinkable mobilized, 
gained strength, and counterattacked.”). 
 136.  Benjamin Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2126–27 (1989).  
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they could not otherwise do so.”137 The primary asterisk to this theme 
of liberalizing class action procedures was mass torts, which the 
Committee disfavored for class treatment.138 
Unfortunately, the aim of the amendment and the text of the 
superiority requirement clash. The Committee elected a “case-by-case 
experimentation” approach to certification decisions.139 The legislative 
history for Rule 23 notes, “In the present incubating stage of the 
development of methods to deal with multiple litigation, it would be 
unwise to introduce stiff rules excluding judicial discretion.”140 John P. 
Frank, one of the only members of the Rule 23 Subcommittee to express 
reservations about such unbridled discretion, cautioned, “[A]ll such 
judgments have to be made not by super men but by run of the mine 
[sic] lawyers who may in a particular instance be judges whose personal 
experience may fall far short of the judgment of this degree of 
sophistication.”141 His warning proved accurate: this abdication of 
rulemaking has allowed unpredictability and inequity to seep into 
judicial decisionmaking.142 
Case-by-case experimentation does not necessarily spell 
disaster.143 Ideally, the interpretations of superiority would “gradually 
close in,” much as other aspects of the Rule 23 analysis have.144 But how 
 
 137.  Statement, supra note 21, at 5. 
 138.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment (“A ‘mass 
accident’ resulting in injuries to numerous persons, is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action 
because of the likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but of liability . . . would 
be present, affecting the individuals in different ways. In these circumstances an action conducted 
nominally as a class action would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately tried.”). 
 139.  See Completion Notes, supra note 7; see also Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, 474 
F.2d 336, 344 (10th Cir. 1973) (discussing how Rule 23 invites case-by-case determinations). 
 140.  Completion Notes, supra note 7. 
 141.  Letter from John P. Frank, Member, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Benjamin 
Kaplan, Reporter, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules (Feb. 21, 1963) (on file with author). 
 142.  Jennifer E. Spreng, Failing Honorably: Balancing Tests, Justice O’Connor and Free 
Exercise of Religion, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 837, 877 (1994) (discussing how granting unconstrained 
discretion is “unpredictable and occasionally even inequitable in practice”); see also Antonin Scalia, 
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (1989) (“[T]he trouble with the 
discretion-conferring approach to judicial law making is that it does not satisfy . . . justice very 
well. When a case is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the 
system of justice is to be respected, not only that the latter case be different, but that be seen to be 
so.”). 
 143.  As Judge Aldisert explains: “Case-by-case development allows experimentation because 
each rule is re-evaluated in subsequent cases to determine whether it produces a fair result. If it 
operates unfairly, it can be modified.” Hon. Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Honorable Ralph Cappy: 
Distinguished Keeper of the King’s Bench Tradition, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 481, 482 (2009). 
 144.  Rule 23(a)(1)’s numerosity requirement is a good example. Courts concur that “no 
definite standard exists as to the size of class that satisfies the numerosity requirement.” Morrow 
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the Committee drafted the rule thwarts the evolution towards clarity. 
The problems begin with the structure of the requirement. Multifactor 
balancing tests invite contradictory weighing of relevant factors.145 
They also allow courts to selectively apply factors, thus producing 
inconsistent results—the very problem plaguing superiority 
jurisprudence.146 This problem is then exacerbated by the lack of 
precision as to what each factor in Rule 23(b)(3)(A)–(D) means.147 
Finally, appellate courts have abdicated their responsibility to create 
uniform interpretations of superiority. 
The Committee Notes only complicate the superiority 
requirement by adding further openings for contrary interpretations.148 
For example, the Notes state a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) is 
appropriate when certification is “convenient and desirable.”149 What is 
convenient, though, is a question of perspective.150 
For an absent class member, a class action is more convenient 
than individual litigation, thus suggesting a generous definition.151 
Absent class members can wait until the case is resolved while their 
rights are asserted in a representative fashion. Their inconvenience is 
then limited to making a claim against any settlement or judgment.152 
 
v. Washington, 277 F.R.D. 172, 190 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (citing Garcia v. Gloor, 609 F.2d 156, 160 (5th 
Cir. 1980)). Nonetheless, over time, courts have reached an agreement on a general range that 
meets the requirement. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 624 (5th 
Cir. 1999) (100 to 150 members generally satisfies numerosity); Rex v. Owens, 585 F.2d 432, 436 
(10th Cir. 1978) (numerosity satisfied in classes with as few as seventeen to twenty members); 
Chauvin v. Chevron Oronite Co., 263 F.R.D. 364, 368 (E.D. La. 2009) (numerosity satisfied with 
class well over 100 members). 
 145.  See Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address—Conference on Compelling Government 
Interests, 55 ALB. L. REV. 535, 544 (1992) (discussing how balancing tests can be unpredictable). 
 146.  See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis 
Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 
1173 (2008) (explaining how multifactor tests that are not firmly anchored in concrete legal rules 
produce irregular interpretations). 
 147.  See infra Part I.A. 
 148.  KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 98 (1969) 
(“Plans, policy statements, and rules are three facets of essentially the same thing; all are designed 
to clarify and to regularize the purpose of the governmental activity.”). 
 149.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 150.  Cf. Ratner v. Chem. Bank N.Y. Tr. Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (“Students of 
the Rule have been led generally to recognize that its broad and open-ended terms call for the 
exercise of some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature.”). 
 151.  See CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 109, at § 18:22 (noting class actions benefit plaintiffs 
by allowing for sharing of expenses between other class members); Mullenix, supra note 134, at 
409 (noting class actions benefit plaintiffs by allowing class members to aggregate claims). 
 152.  As a RAND report on class action explained:  
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In contrast, though, for the assigned judge, a class action is less 
convenient than individual litigation, thus suggesting a more 
restrictive definition of superiority. Class actions require significant 
judicial oversight.153 In the majority of putative class actions, few, if 
any, have filed individual suits.154 Consequently, only in rare cases will 
the aggregate individual claims before a single judge alter the 
convenience calculation.155 But at the same time, it may be more 
convenient for the judiciary as a whole for a single judge to hear related 
matters, again supporting a more generous definition of superiority.156 
The Notes provide no guidance on how to reconcile these competing 
perspectives and the resulting contrary interpretations. 
The Committee Notes also ambiguously suggest superiority may 
vary with the substantive law at issue, though the hedging language 
only flirts with the idea without consummating its import.157 For 
example, the Notes support certification of small stakes claims and 
antitrust cases. Yet, the Notes fail to reconcile this idea with the vague 
text of the superiority requirement.158 
 
Most individuals are too preoccupied with daily life and too uninformed about the law 
to pay attention to whether they are being overcharged or otherwise inappropriately 
treated by those with whom they do business. Even if they believe that there is 
something inappropriate about a transaction, individuals are likely just to “lump it,” 
rather than expend the time and energy necessary to remedy a perceived wrong.  
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE 
GAIN 68 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2000). 
 153.  See Catherine A. Rogers, When Bad Guys Are Wearing White Hats, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX 
LITIG. 487, 497 (2013) (discussing the role of judges in class actions). Class actions require judges 
to wear two hats: one judicial and one fiduciary—serving as arbiter while protecting the rights of 
absent class members. See, e.g., Graham C. Lilly, Modeling Class Actions: The Representative Suit 
as an Analytic Tool, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1008, 1028–29 (2003) (analyzing examples of the Supreme 
Court providing close judicial scrutiny to protect the interests of absent class members). 
 154.  See, e.g., Kelen v. World Fin. Network Nat. Bank, 295 F.R.D. 87, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (no 
pending cases); Baghdasarian v. Amazon.com, Inc., 258 F.R.D. 383, 390 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (same). 
 155.  Asbestos cases are a primary example. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 
415, 422–24 (J.P.M.L. 1991); P.D. Carrington, Asbestos Litigation in the United States: Delay in 
Court and Premature Adjudication, in THE LAW’S DELAY: ESSAYS ON UNDUE DELAY IN CIVIL 
LITIGATION 69, 77–80 (C.H. van Rhee ed., 2004). 
 156.  See, e.g., In re Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:05CV1064 HEA, 2010 WL 5149270, at *1 (E.D. 
Mo. Dec. 13, 2010) (focusing on the judiciary as a whole); U.S. ex rel. Hockett v. Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 25, 38 (D.D.C. 2007) (same). 
 157.  See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398–99 
(2010); John B. Oakley, Illuminating Shady Grove: A General Approach to Resolving Erie 
Problems, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 79, 87 (2010). 
 158.  Statement, supra note 21, at 5 (listing antitrust cases as illustrations of (b)(3) classes 
and discussing the Committee’s interest in “enabling small people with small claims to vindicate 
their rights . . .”). 
4-Bartholomew_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2016 4:51 PM 
1320 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:5:1295 
 
Thus, textually, superiority leaves judges “free from the 
constraints which characteristically attach whenever legal rules enter 
the decision process.”159 This means that a key function for a civil 
procedure rule—maintaining the rule of law through predictability and 
consistency—is lost. 
Unfortunately, superiority also suffers from a second level of 
abdication: a lack of review-restraining oversight.160 By failing to draft 
clear rules, the Committee left the judiciary to sort out the mess.161 
Rather than accepting this responsibility, the Supreme Court and 
circuit courts have repeatedly taken passes during the last five 
decades—focusing more on questions of predominance than 
superiority.162 
For other aspects of Rule 23, “review of class action 
determinations for abuse of discretion does not differ greatly from 
review for error.”163 However, for superiority, circuit courts adopt a 
 
 159.  Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971); see also David P. Leonard, Power and Responsibility in Evidence 
Law, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 937, 941 (1990). Certainly, drawing the fine line between discretion and 
rigid rules is a problem beyond superiority. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 141–42 (Martin 
Ostwald ed. & trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1962) (n.d.); see also, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 148, at 25–26; 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 144–47 (1986) (striving to balance case law and legislation); 
JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 143–
44 (1986) (emphasizing individual considerations rather than abstract rules); H. L. A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 19 (1961); FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 98 (1991).  
 160.  See George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DUKE L.J. 747, 749; see also Scalia, 
supra note 142, at 1178 (“The common-law, discretionary-conferring approach is ill suited, 
moreover, to a legal system in which the supreme court can review only an insignificant proportion 
of the decided cases.”). 
 161.  The Rules Committee is responsible for drafting the rule (and thus revising it to cure 
deficiencies). See Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1128–30 (2002) (explaining the Supreme Court only 
provides a pro forma review of draft rules).  
 162.  This may be because predominance is more outcome determinative than superiority. 
Paper Trail: Working Papers and Recent Scholarship, 11 ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 4 (June 2012) 
(describing predominance as “the most important requirement” for (b)(3) classes); William H. Page, 
Introduction: Reexamining the Standards for Certification of Antitrust Class Actions, ANTITRUST, 
Summer 2007, at 53, 54 n.2 (“[T]he requirement of predominance is most often decisive.”). But see 
Daniel F. v. Blue Shield, 305 F.R.D. 115, 129–30 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (satisfying neither predominance 
nor superiority). Often cases that lack superiority have difficulty satisfying other aspects of Rule 
23. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying certification for lack 
of both predominance and superiority); Mills v. Foremost Ins. Co., 269 F.R.D. 663 (M.D. Fla. 2010) 
(same). 
 163.  Abrams v. Interco Inc., 719 F.2d 23, 28 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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particularly deferential variant of the abuse of discretion standard.164 
Circuit courts frequently reaffirm discretion rather than clarify the 
requirement.165 In the rare instance when a circuit court does reverse, 
the guidance in the case is limited—noting the trial court’s failure to 
consider some factor or addressing a minor aspect of a single factor 
rather than holistically discussing the requirement.166 
Protecting discretion above clarity is particularly clear in a 
recent Fifth Circuit opinion.167 There, the Court upheld a trial court’s 
finding without addressing a circuit split in defining superiority for Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transaction Act (“FACTA”) cases.168 As the Court 
noted: 
Critically important here is the broad discretion enjoyed by district courts regarding 
certification. That discretion may lead to disparate results. In fact, the parties’ briefs 
make clear that district courts have both allowed and refused certification of classes in 
the FACTA context. Nevertheless, we concur with the Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that 
“inconsistent results” regarding certification are “no insurmountable objection” and must 
be permitted “until, if ever, some more acceptable and general solution by amendments 
to the Rules or clarification by statute emerges.”169 
This limited review is often coupled with unpublished or 
otherwise unciteable decision designations. Thus, when one court 
interprets a particular superiority factor in an unpublished opinion, 
another court cannot rely on that decision.170 Instead, the court 
 
 164.  See Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary 
Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 77 (2000) (“Clearly there is no such thing as one 
abuse of discretion standard . . . this standard of review more accurately describes a range of 
appellate responses.” (emphasis added)); see also Rudolph F. Pierce, Esq. & Jennifer M. DeTeso, 
Esq., A Lawyer’s Lament: Unpredictability and Inconsistency in the Wake of the Daubert Trilogy, 
2 SEDONA CONF. J. 163, 170 (2001) (discussing how abuse of discretion standards perpetuate 
“inconsistencies and severely hamper[ ] the ability of appellate courts to develop guidelines of 
general applicability for trial courts and the trial bar”). Superiority differs from other procedural 
rules or statutes, where an abuse of discretion is statutorily defined. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(e)(4)(D) (2012) (immigration rulings); 12 U.S.C. § 203(b)(1) (2012) (appointment of 
conservator); FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b) (discretion of court to receive verdict from eleven-person jury 
after one juror has been dismissed). This contributes to the lack of rigorous review. 
 165.  See, e.g., Ticknor v. Rouse’s Enters., L.L.C., 592 F. App’x 276, 277 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(affirming district court did not “abuse its broad discretion”); N.J. Carpenters Health Fund v. Rali 
Series 2006-QO1 Tr., 477 F. App’x 809, 813–14 (2d Cir. 2012) (same); Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 
509 F.2d 205, 210–11, 213 (9th Cir. 1975) (same). 
 166.  See, e.g., Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1277 (11th Cir. 2009) (reversing 
“extremely cursory” finding of superiority); Gregory v. Finova Capital Corp., 442 F.3d 188, 191 
(4th Cir. 2006) (reversing for not analyzing pending litigation). 
 167.  Ticknor, 592 F. App’x at 277. 
 168.  Id. at 279. 
 169.  See id. (citations omitted). 
 170.  See, e.g., Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 733–35 (2008) (noting that “most commentators, attorneys, and judges 
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reanalyzes the factor anew. This lack of review, plus the initial lack of 
a clear rule, undermine superiority’s ability to predictably, consistently, 
guide the controlled growth of class actions.171 
It is unrealistic, and perhaps undesirable, to eliminate all 
judicial discretion,172 but rules should temper it.173 While judges have 
significant freedom to decide many procedural aspects of a case, 
including case management or electing potential remedies,174 such 
unchecked authority makes little sense for a “death knell” procedural 
rule—one that can make or break a case.175 Unfortunately, this dual-
level abdication is only one of multiple problems for the requirement. 
Superiority’s conflicting goals also sustain judicial division, as 
discussed next. 
 
accept the proposition that unpublished opinions are not binding to any degree on the courts”); 
Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 
GEO. L.J. 621, 647 (2009) (noting that “[courts] may subsequently depart from the rules or holdings 
in those prior unpublished opinions”). 
 171.  Unpublished opinions hinder the growth of “coherent, consistent and intelligible body of 
caselaw.” Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1179 (9th Cir. 2001); see David R. Cleveland, 
Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning Precedential Status to All Opinions, 10 
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 169 (2009) (describing survey where judges attributed inconsistencies 
in law to “inconsistency between published and unpublished opinions or a lack of circuit decisions 
on point”); Sarah E. Ricks, The Perils of Unpublished Non-Precedential Federal Appellate 
Opinions: A Case Study of the Substantive Due Process State-Created Danger Doctrine in One 
Circuit, 81 WASH. L. REV. 217, 228 (2006) (discussing how non-precedential dispositions hinder 
decisionmaking).  In this way, superiority is an example of the “habit of allowing discretionary 
power to grow which far exceeds what is necessary and which is much less controlled than it should 
be.” DAVIS, supra note 148, at 20. 
 172.  See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law 
Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1580–81 (2010) (discussing the benefits of judicial 
discretion); Anna B. Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever for Patent Scope, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & 
TECH. L. REV. 43, 88 (2012) (same). 
 173.  See DAVIS, supra note 148, at 42 (discussing the need “to confine, to structure, and to 
check necessary discretionary power”).  
 174.  See, e.g., 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 580 (2016) (“The trial court has inherent 
authority to control and manage the litigation . . . including sound discretion to control 
discovery.”); Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following Ebay v. 
Mercexchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 72–74 (2007) (discussing judicial discretion in deciding between 
injunctive and monetary relief). 
 175.  See In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 577 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (“Denial of certification can toll the death knell in actions that seek to vindicate large 
numbers of individual claims.” (citing COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES 
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (1997))). 
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B. Conflicting Goals and Consequential Inconsistency 
Abdication of rulemaking responsibility only partly explains 
opposing superiority interpretations. The rule’s legislative history also 
reveals multiple, irreconcilable policy goals. At one point, the 
Committee identified three goals: to advance judicial economy, to 
promote the private enforcement of substantive law (particularly in 
cases involving small individual recovery), and to increase judicial 
consistency.176 Elsewhere, the comments highlight themes of access to 
justice.177 But the legislative history also indicates competing autonomy 
and efficiency concerns.178 These conflicting policy goals are further 
complicated by superiority’s twin references to efficiency and 
fairness179—concepts often at odds. 
Multiple policy goals for a single rule are not facially 
problematic. However, competing goals invite interpretative 
problems.180 The more policy goals, the more difficult it is to reconcile 
or prioritize such goals.181 As this Section details, courts can arbitrarily 
select a particular policy justification to ground a particular conclusion. 
This reverse-engineering reaches its apex when courts decide 
superiority based on efficiency. 
 
 176.  Statement, supra note 21, at 5; see also Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class 
Unity, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 671 (2014); Kaplan, supra note 84, at 391. 
 177.  Statement, supra note 21, at 7 (“If separate litigations are always required, then access 
to the courts may be put out of reach for those whose individual stakes are low or who by reason 
of poverty or ignorance will not go it alone.”). 
 178.  See id. at 4 (“The revision . . . also pays more attention to problems of management and 
procedural fairness . . . .”). 
 179.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that “a class action [be] superior . . . for fairly and 
efficiently adjudicating the controversy” (emphasis added)). 
 180.  See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Discrimination Statutes, the Common Law, and Proximate 
Cause, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 53 (detailing the problems with generating clear proximate cause 
jurisprudence given conflicting policy goals); Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic 
Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1314–15 
(2000) (discussing the difficulty of remedying domestic violence policies because of conflicting 
policy goals). 
 181.  See Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
695, 711–13 (2008) (discussing how multi-goal statutes require balancing multiple goals rather 
than prioritizing one). 
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1. Pick-a-Policy, Any Superiority Policy 
Class actions trigger sentiments about regulation,182 tort 
reform,183 and trial attorneys.184 As these larger debates rage through 
the courts of public perception, the same debates seep into superiority 
decisions.185 Judges can select from one of the stated policies—allowing 
their own attitudes about class actions to chart the unmarked terrains 
of the requirement.186 
By prioritizing different policies, courts can reach contrary 
superiority interpretations. Judges more supportive of class actions 
focus on effectuating legal rights, avoiding a multiplicity of suits, or 
enhancing private enforcement—goals that support generously 
defining superiority.187 For judges more wary of class actions, autonomy 
and efficiency considerations offer a way to interpret superiority 
restrictively.188 
Harkening back to Part I, the policy lens the court adopts 
explains the three chief areas of disagreement. For example, take 
conflicting judicial conclusions about monetary recovery.189 Judges 
 
 182.  See, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1141–42 (2012) (discussing the intersection between 
class actions and private regulation). 
 183.  Critics of tort reform often also take aim at class actions. See, e.g., Edward A. Purcell, 
Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New in Federal Jurisdictional 
Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1903 (2008) (“CAFA was a direct product of the ‘tort reform’ 
movement.”). 
 184.  See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of 
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 669, 670 n.3 (1986) (noting “the frequency with which judicial opinions favoring 
new restrictions on the availability of class actions or other remedies criticize the plaintiff’s 
attorney”); see also Nicholas Lemann, The Newcomer: Senator John Edwards is This Season’s 
Democratic Rising Star, NEW YORKER 58, 82 (May 6, 2002) (detailing the current trend of 
negatively depicting class action trial attorneys). 
 185.  See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the 
Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 117–18 (2003) 
(“Additionally, the judiciary itself has, on more than one occasion, expressed disdain for plaintiff 
class action attorneys.”). 
 186.  Judge Posner uses the term “occasional legislators” to characterize the role judges play 
in the absence of clear rules. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 5 (2008). 
 187.  See, e.g., Romero v. La Revise Assocs., L.L.C., 58 F. Supp. 3d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); 
Phillips v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 00-4275, 2002 WL 34592201, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2002). 
 188.  See, e.g., Taddeo v. Am. Invsco Corp., No. 2:08-CV-01463-KJD-RJJ, 2011 WL 3957392, 
at *5 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2011); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 225 F.R.D. 14, 23 (D. Mass. 2004). 
 189.  Compare Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1196–97 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(certifying action involving six figure and million dollar recoveries, plus remand to determine 
punitive damages for absent class members), with Berther v. TSYS Total Debt Mgmt. Inc., No. 06-
C-293, 2007 WL 1795472, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 19, 2007) (finding “no reason to conclude that a 
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favoring autonomy narrowly define the individuals’ interests factor: the 
amount of individual recovery that triggers inferiority is lower. For 
judges favoring private enforcement or access to courts, the amount is 
higher. 
Judicial approaches to questions of choice similarly turn on 
policy decisions. For example, the alternative methods analysis hinges 
on whether judges select autonomy concerns over private enforcement 
and right to access. Judges focused on autonomy define relevant 
alternative methods more broadly, as such alternatives increase 
individuals’ abilities to elect from different ways to resolve claims.190 
Judges favoring private enforcement define such alternatives narrowly, 
focusing more on the gains of collective action and the challenges of 
individual litigation against well-funded corporate defendants.191 
Conflicting policy goals also explain the tension over judicial 
resources, particularly for manageability. If efficiency and autonomy 
concerns trump, case management options like bifurcation are less 
likely to overcome management difficulties—thus making superiority 
hard to establish.192 For a judge basing the analysis on enforcement or 
right of access, though, the degree of unmanageability must be high to 
overcome the enforcement gain.193 Thus, the tension between the aims 
of the superiority requirement explains each area of judicial dissonance. 
 
maximum recovery of $1,000 would be insufficient to motivate an individual plaintiff to pursue 
private litigation” and that individual litigation may be superior to class litigation where 
maximum class recovery is $10 per member). 
 190.  See, e.g., In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prods. Liab. Litig., 251 F.R.D. 689, 700 (N.D. Ga. 
2008). 
 191.  See, e.g., Allen v. Hyland’s Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 671–72 (C.D. Cal. 2014). Similarly, for 
ascertainability, decisions splinter over efficiency and enforcement goals. Compare Marcus v. 
BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining the ascertainability 
requirement eliminates serious administrative burdens by “insisting on the easy identification of 
class members”), with Ries v. Ariz. Beverages USA LLC, 287 F.R.D. 523, 535 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (rejecting a strict ascertainability requirement because otherwise “there would be no such 
thing as a consumer class action”). 
 192.  See, e.g., Barry v. S.E.B. Serv. of N.Y., Inc., No. 11-CV-5089 (SLT)(JMA), 2013 WL 
6150718, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013) (finding inefficiency challenges posed by individual issues 
make the certification inferior without consideration of management tools); Brinker v. Chi. Title 
Ins. Co., No. 8:10-CV-1199-T-27AEP, 2012 WL 1081182, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2012) (same); cf. 
Legge v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., No. CV 02-8676DSF(VNKX), 2004 WL 5235587 (C.D. Cal. June 
25, 2004) (“Courts bear a significant responsibility to insure that the great power wielded by 
plaintiffs (or more accurately their counsel) carrying the cudgel of a class action is used only in 
appropriate cases.”). 
 193.  See, e.g., Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 
1990) (rejecting manageability challenges, given “enforcement, deterrence or disgorgement” 
functions of the pending class claim); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322, 356 (E.D. 
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Beyond the divides from Part I, indiscriminate policy selection 
also explains why superiority lacks intrasubstantive, let alone 
transsubstantive, application. Even within a single area of law, 
superiority depends on which policy goal a court selects. Perhaps the 
starkest example of this is in antitrust class actions.194 Differing judicial 
ideologies on the role of private enforcement crop up, with some courts 
recognizing such actions as mechanisms for enforcement and 
deterrence.195 This viewpoint often corresponds with a broader 
definition of superiority.196 For example, the court in In re Cement 
focused on the benefits of price-fixing class actions.197 As the court 
noted, “The public at large will likewise benefit from a class action and 
expeditious adjudication of the issues involved since class actions 
‘reenforce the regulatory scheme by providing an additional deterrent 
beyond that afforded either by public enforcement or by single-party 
private enforcement.’ ”198 
In contrast, other courts view private enforcement as a 
questionable consequence of class actions. For example, In re Hotel 
 
Pa. 1976) (finding certification furthers private enforcement, thus superiority exists “when only 
speculative manageability difficulties are perceived”). 
 194.  That said, this divide also applies in other substantive claims, such as in cases regarding 
the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2012). Compare Nadeau v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., No. 10-4356 (PAM/JSM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49648, at *12 (D. Minn. April 26, 2011) 
(defining superiority broadly), with Kinder v. Nw. Bank, 278 F.R.D. 176, 185–86 (W.D. Mich. 2011) 
(defining superiority narrowly). 
 195.  See, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., 911 F. Supp. 2d 857, 870 (N.D. 
Cal. 2012) (discussing “vigorous private antitrust enforcement” as a policy goal in antitrust class 
actions); Diamond Chem. Co. v. Akzo Nobel Chems. B.V., 517 F. Supp. 2d 212, 218–219 (D.D.C. 
2007) (noting the “punitive and deterrence goals” of the Sherman Antitrust Act); see also Joshua 
P. Davis, Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private Antitrust 
Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1, 25 (2013) (providing an empirical case for antitrust class actions’ 
deterrence and private enforcement efficacy). 
 196.  See, e.g., In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 302 F.R.D. 339, 353 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(finding superiority because “a class action device enables individual direct purchasers to pursue 
their claims in an economically feasible manner, with greater efficacy in achieving enforcement 
and deterrence goals and with greater bargaining power for settlement purposes”); In re Relafen 
Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 287 (D. Mass. 2004) (“The Advisory Committee’s core concern 
[with the right to access] was particularly compelling here, where protection of the public depends 
upon vigorous private enforcement of state laws but the small size of individual claims renders 
such enforcement unlikely.”). 
 197.  In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 27 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1334, *3 (D. 
Ariz. 1979). 
 198.  Id. (quoting Hackett v. Gen. Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972)); see also In re 
Processed Egg, 302 F.R.D. at 352–53 (“[W]hen ‘each consumer has a very small claim in relation 
to the cost of prosecuting a lawsuit . . . , a class action facilitates spreading of the litigation costs 
among the numerous injured parties and encourages private enforcement of the 
statutes.’ ”(citation omitted)). 
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Telephone Charges involved nationwide class claims of price-fixing 
against hotel chains.199 In finding a lack of superiority, the court focused 
on how time consuming litigation would be for the judiciary relative to 
the minimal individual recovery.200 The court rejected deterrence 
benefits, stating: “[T]he Congressional scheme does not contemplate 
that private attorneys are to act as prosecutors to force antitrust 
violators to disgorge their illegal profits in the general interest of society 
at large.”201 While this conclusion directly contradicts In re Cement—
and a great deal of other authority202—it also leads to a notably more 
restrictive superiority definition. 
Thus, rather than a clear threshold that applies consistently—
at a minimum in a single substantive area—superiority’s contours ebb 
and flow with the particular ideology a judge imports. The resulting 
lack of consensus is unsurprising, though no less troubling. 
 
2. Undefined Efficiency and the Superiority Problem 
Just as judges focus on different policy goals, concepts of 
efficiency spur further divergent rule interpretation.203 Rule 23(b)(3) 
instructs courts to evaluate if certification is a superior method for 
“fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy,” though fails to 
define efficiency—a problem given the term’s multiple meanings.204 The 
meaning of efficiency varies by the decisionmaker: some apply a “rough 
 
 199.  In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 200.  See id. at 90–92.  
 201.  Id. at 92.  
 202.  See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
546 (1983) (“Congress sought to create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter 
violators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample 
compensation to the victims of antitrust violations.” (quoting Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 
465, 472 (1982))). 
 203.  See, e.g., Tardiff v. Knox Cnty., 365 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “the balance 
of cost and benefit doubtless varies from case to case”); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 227 
F.R.D. 65, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing that “[a]ny consideration of superiority . . . [is] 
subjective; it must weigh the benefits and costs of allowing the class action to proceed versus the 
benefits and costs of individual adjudication”). 
 204.  Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CALIF. 
L. REV. 509, 516 (1994) (describing economic efficiency as a “notorious example” of ambiguity); 
James M. Buchanan, Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J.L. & 
ECON. 124, 126 (1959) (“ ‘Efficiency’ . . . is meaningless without some common denominator, some 
value scale, against which possible results can be measured.”). 
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economic” analysis; others adopt a strict cost-benefit evaluation.205 Both 
views tempt erratic superiority interpretations. 
Even roughly defined, efficiency depends on perspective. 
Namely, efficiency for whom: (1) the judiciary facing years of complex 
and time-consuming litigation, (2) the plaintiffs depending on such 
litigation as the only realistic option for recourse, or (3) the defendant 
benefiting from any classwide preclusive effect though facing much 
greater exposure than in individual litigation?206 If all three 
considerations should be balanced, how? The rule provides no key to 
answer these questions. 
Hence, regardless of whether efficiency is defined broadly or 
narrowly, the term only adds to the confusion over superiority. Strict 
cost-benefit analyses generate different questions than rough 
efficiency.207 Which variables count, and what trade-offs still align with 
fairness and justice? Should the judicial resources expended depend on 
the case’s value? If so, how should value be defined: Do only monetary 
judgments count, or should other potential gains, such as information 
sharing, be included even if harder to quantify?208 What about trade-
 
 205.  Compare In re Netbank, Inc., Sec. Litig., 259 F.R.D. 656, 667 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (noting that 
“[t]he key to certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) is whether the efficiency and economy of 
class adjudication outweighs the difficulties and complexity of individual adjudication” (citations 
omitted)), and Bone, supra note 176, at 657–58 (describing superiority and predominance as just 
“rough ways to measure the benefits of class treatment”), with Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 558, 580 
(D.N.M. 2011) (noting that class action certification is appropriate in cases like securities fraud 
actions where “the costs of litigation would likely outweigh any benefit obtained” (quoting In re 
Ribozyme Pharms., Inc., Sec. Litig., 205 F.R.D. 572, 579 (D. Colo. 2001))). This approach revives a 
previously abandoned amendment to superiority from 1966 to (1) alter the requirement to consider 
if the putative class was “necessary” rather than “superior,” (2) add a cost-benefit analysis, and (3) 
eliminate the (b)(3) inquiry for settlement classes. See PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CLASS ACTION 
RULE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (Published for Notice and Comment, Aug. 15, 1996); 
John K. Rabiej, The Making of Class Action Rule 23—What Were We Thinking?, 24 MISS. C. L. 
REV. 323, 364 (2005). After a groundswell of criticism of the cost-benefit amendment, the 
Subcommittee withdrew the proposal in its entirety. See Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D. Rowe, 
Jr., Beyond “It Just Ain’t Worth It”: Alternative Strategies for Damages Class Action Reform, LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2001, at 137, 141. 
 206.  This list may be underinclusive. See Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 760 (3d 
Cir. 1974) (“Superiority must be looked at from the point of view (1) of the judicial system, (2) of 
the potential class members, (3) of the present plaintiff, (4) of the attorneys for the litigants, (5) of 
the public at large and (6) of the defendant. The listing is not necessarily in order of importance of 
the respective interests. Superiority must also be looked at from the point of view of the issues.”). 
 207.  See Patrick A. Luff, Bad Bargains: The Mistake of Allowing Cost-Benefit Analyses in 
Class Action Certification Decisions, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 65, 68 (2010) (“Opponents of the class 
action mechanism believe that the harms associated with class actions outweigh their benefits . . . . 
Conversely, proponents of class actions believe that the social benefits outweigh the costs.”). 
 208.  See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 
1189 (2011) (“[M]easuring deterrence and thus quantifying optimal deterrence is nearly 
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offs in terms of other cases the court cannot hear during the pendency 
of the claim?209 Even if these initial hurdles are cleared, how much 
benefit must exceed cost is unclear: Is one cent enough?210 
Given these unanswered queries, a cost-benefit approach 
requires courts to exercise value judgments.211 For some courts, the only 
relevant variables are the cost of litigation versus the potential 
recovery,212 while others include less quantifiable variables, such as 
balancing the efficiency of classwide determinations and right of access 
gains against manageability challenges.213 This disagreement is 
compounded by superiority’s instruction to consider efficiency and 
fairness coequally. Not only is fairness a concept as nebulous as 
efficiency,214 the two are often inversely related.215 Professor Brian Bix 
explains: 
It is fair enough to look back in wonder, and some disdain, at a time when legal rules were 
evaluated only in terms of some intuitive sense of fairness, with no regard to their 
instrumental value (and with certainly no reference to their “efficiency”). At the same 
 
impossible . . . .”); Luff, supra note 207, at 88 (discussing the difficulty of measuring non-monetary 
benefits). 
 209.  See Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the Common Law: 
An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to Large-Number 
Externality Problems, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961, 968–69 (1996) (discussing challenges with 
valuation subjectivity). 
 210.  See Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analyses and the Environment, 115 ETHICS 351, 353, 376 
(2005). 
 211.  See Patrick C. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in Tax Policy 
Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501, 534 (1997) (recognizing the flaws of the premise “that efficiency 
issues can be constructively decided wholly apart from subjective value judgments”); Zywicki, 
supra note 209, at 976–77.  
 212.  See, e.g., Allen v. Hyland’s Inc., 300 F.R.D. 643, 671 (C.D. Cal. 2014); Lane v. Page, 272 
F.R.D. 558, 580–81 (D.N.M. 2011). 
 213.  See, e.g., In re Bank of Am. Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) Contract 
Litig., No. 10-2193-RWZ, 2013 WL 4759649, at *14 (D. Mass. Sept. 4, 2013). Still others go further, 
and narrowly focus on the amount of actual harm (as opposed to statutory harm) suffered versus 
the financial impact on the defendant of certification. See, e.g., Azoiani v. Love’s Travel Stops & 
Country Stores, Inc., No. EDCV 07-90 ODW (OPx), 2007 WL 4811627, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 
2007); Soualian v. Int’l Coffee & Tea LLC, No. CV 07-502-RGK (JCx), 2007 WL 4877902, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. June 11, 2007).  
 214.  Cf. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280, 283 (1970) (discussing “the vague and 
nebulous concept of ‘fairness’ ”); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of 
Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. REV. 375, 405 (1999) (stating that “an intuitive sense of fairness is 
too vague and unreliable to serve as a basis of legal decision making” (citations omitted)). 
 215.  See Yishai Boyarin, Court-Connected ADR—a Time of Crisis, a Time of Change, 95 MARQ. 
L. REV. 993, 1032 (2012); Stephanie Smith & Janet Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute 
Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 130 (2009). This tension exists generally in 
efficiency and fairness balancing, not just for procedural rules. For example, scholars have detailed 
this tension in the criminal justice arena. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and 
the Rest of Us, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 238, 239 (1966). 
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time, one may wonder whether there has been an “overcorrection” . . . . Of course, if one 
acts, it should be with eyes open: aware of the costs (including efficiency costs) . . . . 
However, it is a basic point, long ago conceded by Calabresi and Melamed, that efficiency 
will only be one value among many, and that we should be conscious of actual and 
potential (and potentially desirable) tradeoffs of less efficiency for more fairness or 
justice.216 
This struggle to balance fairness and efficiency provides an 
alternative explanation for the judicial divides set forth in Part I. In 
addressing judicial resources, different efficiency definitions cloud three 
factors: (1) pending litigation, (2) alternative methods, and most 
extensively, (3) manageability. 
First, for the pending litigation analysis, some courts define 
efficiency as the absence of other cases, while others see the existence 
of such cases as proof that certification is superior. For example, in Arch 
v. American Tobacco, the court found a lack of superiority because of 
the paucity of tried individual claims.217 In reaching that conclusion, 
the court hinged its analysis on potential inefficiencies: “Even assuming 
that the courts will be exposed to many more of these types of . . . cases, 
‘a conclusion that certification will save judicial resources is premature 
at this stage of the litigation.’ ”218 
Yet, other courts have certified novel claims, finding a single 
resolution of related claims efficient. In Klay v. Humana, the court held 
the potential efficiency gains of consolidation made the class superior.219 
There, the court explained, if the claim “raises a variety of new or 
complicated legal questions, then those questions constitute significant 
common issues of law” and their “resolution in a single class-action 
forum would greatly foster judicial efficiency and avoid unnecessary, 
repetitious litigation.”220 There is no irrefutable, “correct” efficiency 
position—just arguments that generate incompatible superiority 
interpretations. 
Second, for alternative methods of adjudication, efficiency 
complicates cases involving overlapping federal and state class actions, 
as is evident in two Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) cases. In 
 
 216.  Brian Bix, Epstein, Craswell, Economics, Unconscionability, and Morality, 19 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 715, 723 (2000) (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
 217.  Arch v. Am. Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469, 495 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 218.  Id. (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 749 (5th Cir. 1996)).  
 219.  Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other 
grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). 
 220.  Id.; see also In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 726 (4th Cir. 1989) (coordinating novel 
claims provides “a mechanism for deciding expeditiously, efficiently and relatively inexpensively 
these actions without the delays of individual suits”). 
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Ladegaard v. Hard Rock Concrete Cutters, Inc.,221 the court found 
superiority: “[E]ven with the presence of the FLSA action, individual 
plaintiffs could bring an action in state court on the state claims. To 
avoid this result, and to further judicial economy, it is desirable to 
concentrate the litigation in one forum.”222 In contrast, in Muecke v. A-
Reliable Auto Parts & Wreckers,223 the court held a federal class 
inefficient—and thus lacking superiority—where, “[e]ach of those 
persons then will be able to pursue on his or her own behalf state law 
claims, which cover the very same conduct as the FLSA claim.”224 
Third, while efficiency is a thread in multiple superiority factors, 
it is at the forefront of manageability.225 Efficiency considerations risk 
reverse engineering, much like the rule’s differing policy goals.226 For 
example, courts that add a strict ascertainability requirement to 
manageability frequently only focus on the heavy efficiency burden of 
identifying class members.227 Such one-sided analyses mean a class is 
rarely superior.228 Others balance such challenges against the gains of 
a class and the potential unfairness of precluding certification—leading 
to differing superiority decisions.229 
Thus, superiority’s reference to efficiency is a key piece to the 
interpretation puzzle. Judges cannot objectively define efficiency, let 
alone balance it against the equally elusive concept of fairness. This 
 
 221.  No. 00 C 5755, 2000 WL 1774091, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 2000). 
 222.  Id.; accord O’Brien v. Encotech Const. Servs., Inc., 203 F.R.D. 346, 350 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 
(“Were plaintiffs to file multiple claims under multiple laws in multiple fora, precious judicial 
resources would be wasted on duplicative lawsuits. This result would be inefficient.”). 
 223.  No. 01 C 2361, 2002 WL 1359411, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 21, 2002). 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  See supra Part I.B (detailing judicial disagreement over (b)(3)(D)). 
 226.  See supra Part I.A; cf. EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 129, at 41 (2013) (“[P]rocedural 
doctrines that reduce workload have only a short-run effect in curbing ideological judging.”). 
 227.  Accord In re Worldcom, Inc., 343 B.R. 412, 423 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006); see, e.g., Boca 
Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 238 F.R.D. 679, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2006), aff’d sub 
nom. Boca Raton Cmty. Hosp., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 582 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2009). 
Overburdened dockets may also contribute to this narrow definition. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, 
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 322–24 (1977) 
(reporting statistics that confirm courts are overburdened, impacting the quality of justice). 
 228.  See, e.g., In re POM Wonderful LLC, No. ML 10-02199 DDP (RZx), 2014 WL 1225184, at 
*6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2014); Franks v. MKM Oil, Inc., No. 10 CV 00013, 2012 WL 3903782, at *7 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2012) (denying superiority because identifying class members would be 
“burdensome” without balancing those burdens against gains of certification). 
 229.  Compare Ackerman v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09 CV 395(DLI)(RML), 2013 WL 7044866, at 
*21 (E.D.N.Y. July 18, 2013) (balancing judicial access gains against ascertainability challenges 
to find a lack of superiority), with Astiana v. Kashi Co., 291 F.R.D. 493, 500 (S.D. Cal. 2013) 
(balancing access and burden to find superiority despite ascertainability challenges). 
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only worsens the indifferent rule drafting, insufficient judicial review, 
and conflicting policy goals underlying the superiority requirement. 
Considered collectively, these explanations pave a clearer path to 
curing this troubled area of civil procedure doctrine. 
III. THE ROAD AHEAD 
While Parts I and II explored the extent and roots of the 
problems, Part III focuses on the needed fix: striking the superiority 
requirement from Rule 23.230 Rewritten, Rule 23(b)(3) would read: “A 
class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: . . . (3) 
the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class members 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. 
Adjudication of those questions shall be handled through case 
management tools.” 
This Part unpackages and defends this proposal. First, it makes 
the case for striking superiority in toto. Second, it discusses how other 
procedural rules can answer the policy concerns and legal questions 
that arise under superiority, offsetting the need for a second inquiry. 
Instead, courts can focus on strengthening existing case management 
tools. Third, this Part defends the proposal against the most anticipated 
criticism—the need for procedural screening. With the details spelled 
out and the counterarguments rebutted, this solution remedies the 
inferiority of superiority. 
A. The Case for Rethinking Superiority 
From its lack of a clear design to its conflicting purposes, the 
superiority requirement fails to clearly and consistently guide 
certification decisions. Eliminating the requirement is the only 
functional solution.231 Existing interpretations raise concerns about 
judicial overreach and endanger judicial access. 
 
 230.  Perhaps recognizing some of these problems, the Rule 23 Subcommittee is reassessing 
superiority. Though in its infancy, a current proposal would only remove the superiority analysis 
for settlement classes. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 11–20 
(April 9–10, 2015). This Article argues the proposal should be broadened to remove the superiority 
requirement altogether. 
 231.  While this Article does not focus on institutional choice, the Rules Committee, rather 
than the Supreme Court, should revise the Rule. First, the current rulemaking process for a federal 
civil procedure rule involves seven stages of comment and review, of which Supreme Court review 
is but one. This multi-stage process (authorized by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)) 
“does not contemplate that the Court could [alter a rule] outside the rulemaking structure.” Struve, 
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The Rules Enabling Act sets the outer limits of permissible 
interpretations of procedural rules.232 While courts can design “a 
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by 
substantive law,”233 they cannot construe procedural rules to “abridge, 
enlarge or modify any substantive right.”234 But existing 
interpretations of superiority, such as the presumption that novel 
claims are unmanageable, do abridge substantive law in two ways. 
First, if prior class actions must exist, the causes of action that can be 
certified become a closed universe. Such circular reasoning effectively 
adds a class action preclusion to abridge existing substantive law. 
Second, superiority interpretations that preclude class actions 
outright for certain legal theories abridge plaintiffs’ ability to enforce 
their substantive rights. Such interpretations limit plaintiffs to 
individual suits, thus foregoing the benefits of collective actions,235 such 
as sharing costs, counsel, and information about the defendants’ alleged 
wrongdoing.236 Without such benefits, it is often unrealistic for 
 
supra note 161, at 1103–04, 1129 (summarizing the Court’s limited role in the rulemaking process). 
Thus, this approach respects the democratic participatory process already in place. Second, when 
the Supreme Court has stepped into a quasi-legislating role to revise other procedural rules, the 
results have increased confusion, rather than predictability or clarity. See, e.g., Jill Curry & 
Matthew Ward, Are Twombly & Iqbal Affecting Where Plaintiffs File? A Study Comparing Removal 
Rates by State, 45 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 827, 831 (2013) (discussing how the Court’s revised pleading 
requirements caused lower court confusion). Third, recent Supreme Court class action 
jurisprudence suggests the majority of the Court will not consider the countervailing gains class 
actions provide should it address superiority. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. 
Ct. 2304, 2320 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[T]o a Court bent on diminishing the usefulness of 
Rule 23, everything looks like a class action, ready to be dismantled.”). 
 232.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (explaining how neither Congress 
nor the federal courts have “power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state 
whether they be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the law of 
torts”). 
 233.  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407 (2010) 
(quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941)). 
 234.  28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970) (providing that the “Supreme Court shall have the power to 
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United 
States district courts” and “[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive 
right”). 
 235.  See Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. 
L. REV. 743, 784 (2015); Anne Bloom, From Justice to Global Peace: A (Brief) Genealogy of the Class 
Action Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 719, 719 (2006); Darren Carter, Notice and the Protection of 
Class Members’ Interests, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1996). 
 236.  See Bartholomew, supra note 235, at 784. Individual litigation is so unlikely for small 
sum cases that defendants have agreed to class action settlements that only preclude the right to 
participate in future class or aggregate claims, leaving open the potential for individual suit. See, 
e.g., In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 741 F.3d 811, 811 (7th Cir. 2014). As Professor Rave 
explains: “An ultimately cheaper route to resolving [defendant’s] liability might be to purchase the 
class members’ rights to proceed on an aggregate basis, allowing individual plaintiffs to go at it 
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individual consumers to take on large, well-funded corporate 
defendants.237 
This judicial overreach disproportionately jeopardizes small 
sum cases—the very cases the Rules Committee sought to empower by 
adopting Rule 23(b)(3).238 As Judge Posner notes, “only a lunatic or a 
fanatic” would bring such cases individually.239 Nonetheless, some 
decisions deny certification specifically because the amount at stake is 
minimal. For example, in Ramirez v. Dollar Phone Corp.,240 the Eastern 
District of New York denied class certification for a group of low-income, 
non-English-speaking immigrant calling-card consumers.241 The court 
held that because consumers suffered small individual damages, a class 
was not superior to other avenues of redress, such as legislative 
action.242 
Thus, more sweeping reform is needed to starve the growth of 
further interpretative dissonance. Any more modest approach will not 
suffice. Creating a hierarchy amid the various superiority factors or 
focusing on a sole factor would leave in place the morass of conflicting 
interpretations, including those that run afoul the Rules Enabling Act 
or place small stake claims at risk. 
B. Reabsorbing Superiority 
Eliminating superiority makes sense for a second reason. As it 
presently stands, the judiciary is unchecked, guessing at which 
interpretations to apply. Such guesswork is unnecessary. As detailed 
below, other procedural rules have matured during superiority’s 
duration. Most notably, the two policy concerns behind the more 
restrictive definitions of superiority—efficiency and autonomy—are 
already addressed by current interpretations of the predominance 
requirement. As previously explained,243 to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) 
“questions of law or fact common to class members [must] predominate 
 
alone if they so choose, but knowing full well that most plaintiffs won’t bother.” D. Theodore Rave, 
When Peace is Not the Goal of a Class Action Settlement, 50 GA. L. REV. 475, 477 (2016). 
 237.  Rave, supra note 236.  
 238.  Statement, supra note 21, at 7. 
 239.  Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 240.  668 F. Supp. 2d 448, 468 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 241.  Id. 
 242.  Id. (“In the present case, the only adequate and appropriate way to protect the rights of 
the Rule 23(b)(3) class is through regulation and enforcement by a federal administrative 
agency.”). 
 243.  See supra Part I (explaining predominance). 
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over any questions affecting only individual members.”244 Efficiency—
however defined—is at the core of this predominance inquiry.245 When 
issues of law or fact are shared amongst class members, resolving the 
claims collectively is more efficient than a series of individual cases.246 
Inversely, a lack of shared issues necessarily means collective 
treatment does not preserve resources as compared to individual 
litigation, and thus is inefficient.247 This relationship makes a second 
efficiency inquiry under superiority superfluous. 
Similarly, predominance absorbs autonomy questions. 
Autonomy concerns parallel individual issues: the more individual 
issues, the more legitimate the worries about individuals wanting 
decisionmaking control.248 But when collective issues predominate, 
such autonomy concerns are fewer.249 They are offset by the gains of 
collective action.250 This is particularly true for small-stakes cases.251 As 
Professor David Marcus explains, claims that cannot realistically be 
litigated outside a class action “may not deserve or even enjoy the sort 
of due process protection that places a premium on individual 
autonomy.”252 In a case that satisfies predominance, individual choice 
 
 244.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 245.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment 
(explaining the goal of subdivision (b)(3) to “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense”); 
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615–16 (1997); Moore v. Stellar Recovery, Inc., No. 
13 C 2294, 2014 WL 3509729, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014) (“Predominance is a question of 
efficiency.”); CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 109, at § 4:49. 
 246.  See Bloom, supra note 235, at 719; Carter, supra note 235, at 1121. 
 247.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006 n.12 (11th Cir. 1997) 
(discussing how predominance and efficiency are “intertwined”); Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX 
Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 394 (D.N.M. 2015). 
 248.  See Bartholomew, supra note 235, at 784; Bloom, supra note 235, at 719; Carter, supra 
note 235, at 1121. 
 249.  Cf. Jon Romberg, The Hybrid Class Action as Judicial Spork: Managing Individual 
Rights in a Stew of Common Wrong, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 231, 239 (2006) (discussing the 
relationship between predominance in (b)(2) classes and autonomy). 
 250.  See id. at 288 (discussing how predominance balances questions of individual choice with 
efficiency). How much weight to afford autonomy concerns seems inversely related to the amount 
at issue. See Erbsen, supra note 104, at 1008 n.17 (discussing how autonomy interests carry little 
or no weight where “economic value of plaintiffs’ claims is small relative to the defendant’s 
aggregate stakes in the litigation, such that plaintiffs would likely be unable to litigate . . . outside 
of a class action”). 
 251.  See Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (2012) 
(“A plaintiff with a small claim has no incentive to bring suit or, for that matter, to defect from a 
class action.”). 
 252.  David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1990 (2008). 
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is still preserved through notice and opt-out procedures,253 further 
minimizing any lingering autonomy unease. With autonomy and 
efficiency accounted for, a second round of screening under superiority 
is unwarranted. Bringing this overlap to light further supports 
removing the troublesome superiority requirement.254 
1. How Predominance Answers Superiority 
In addition to addressing autonomy and efficiency concerns, the 
predominance analysis also subsumes superiority’s individuals’ 
interest factor and manageability inquiries. First, the individuals’ 
interest analysis under Rule 23(b)(3)(A) frequently focuses on the 
amount at stake.255 The greater the amount, the more courts presume 
such interests.256 However, this is a false proxy.257 Whether someone 
would actually sue is too dependent on individual whims. 
Predominance removes some of this subjectivity. The quantum 
of shared issues of law and fact become the proxy for gauging 
individuals’ interests.258 The greater the degree of predominance, the 
more likely individuals’ interests give way to the benefits of 
certification.259 This is also why predominance intersects with 
autonomy.260 Thus, there is no need for courts to rely on superiority’s 
amount at stake or other equally questionable substitutes to evaluate 
individuals’ interests. 
Second, predominance also resolves manageability. Removing 
the manageability analysis cures the “largely unfounded belief that 
 
 253.  See, e.g., Spann v. J.C. Penney Corp., 307 F.R.D. 508, 532 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing 
opt-out options); Klamberg v. Roth, 473 F. Supp. 544, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same). 
 254.  As an important clarification, courts should carefully conscribe the interpretations of 
these other procedure rules. Otherwise, eliminating superiority would just shift the existing strife 
onto other factors.  
 255.  See, e.g., Pipefitters Local 636 Ins. Fund v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 654 F.3d 618, 628 
(6th Cir. 2011) (focusing (b)(3)(A) analysis on whether class members are able to pursue claims 
individually); In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 962 F. Supp. 450, 523 (D.N.J. 
1997) (same); In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 732 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
 256.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s notes to 1966 amendment. 
 257.  See Herkert v. MRC Receivables Corp., 254 F.R.D. 344, 352–53 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
 258.  Accord Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013); see 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring common questions “predominate over any questions affecting 
only individual [class] members”). 
 259.  See WRIGHT, supra note 57, at 518–19 (“[T]he predominance test really involves an 
attempt to achieve a balance between the value of allowing individual actions to be instituted so 
that each person can protect his own interests and the economy that can be achieved by allowing 
a multiple party dispute to be resolved on a class action basis.”); Romberg, supra note 249, at 288. 
 260.  See infra Part III.A. 
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district courts cannot handle . . . [complex] class actions . . . 
[recognizing instead that it] takes some elbow grease and some 
creativity, but it is not impossible” to manage such claims.261 Any 
complex litigation undoubtedly will generate judicial hardship, but that 
alone is a faulty basis for denying judicial access.262 Predominance sets 
limits on the potential challenges a court must address in a class 
action.263 When a putative class action satisfies the requirement,264 the 
resulting manageability challenges should be tolerated. Conversely, 
when common issues do not predominate, courts generally agree 
manageability is a problem.265 
This Article’s proposal seeks to expand and to codify this 
relationship.266 In doing so, it builds on the approach already taken by 
 
 261.  Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 461 (D.N.M. 2015). 
 262.  See, e.g., James D. Hinson Elec. Contracting Co. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 275 
F.R.D. 638, 648 (M.D. Fla. 2011) (explaining that manageability issues are “intrinsic in large class 
actions” and thus not enough to deny superiority when predominance is satisfied); John Conyers, 
Jr., Class Action “Fairness”—A Bad Deal for the States and Consumers, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 493, 
493 (2003). 
 263.  See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 604 (5th Cir. 2006); Stalley 
v. ADS All. Data Sys., Inc., 296 F.R.D. 670, 686 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“the predominance analysis has 
a tremendous impact on the superiority analysis” (citation omitted)); Bevrotte ex rel. Bevrotte v. 
Caesars Entm’t Corp., No. CIV.A. 11-543, 2011 WL 4634174, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2011) 
(“predominance and superiority . . . are intertwined”); Shelley v. AmSouth Bank, No. CIV.A.97-
1170-RV-C, 2000 WL 1121778, at *8 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2000), aff’d, 247 F.3d 250 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(“superiority analysis is ‘intertwined’ with predominance analysis”). Even the Supreme Court 
fused the two, suggesting a more careful predominance inquiry in cases where “individual stakes 
are high and disparities among class members great.” Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 
591, 625 (1997). 
 264.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 265.  Ginsburg v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns Mgmt. LLC, No. C11-1959RAJ, 2013 WL 1661483, 
at *8 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2013) (“[B]ecause of the individualized issues on which class members’ 
claims would ultimately depend, a class action would be unmanageable.”). 
 266.  Using predominance to evaluate the underlying concerns of superiority is analogical to 
the approach advocated in Professor Jay Tidmarsh’s work. Jay Tidmarsh, Superiority as Unity, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 565, 566–67 (2013). This essay advocates for an alternative framework for 
evaluating certification based on what Tidmarsh coins the “superiority principle.” This principle 
is a means for assessing class cohesion and is distinct from the superiority factors analyzed in this 
Article. Rather than the current multi-factor Rule 23 analysis, he argues certification should turn 
on whether the claims asserted are sufficiently cohesive. See id. at 585. Interestingly, though, the 
proposed principle is akin to predominance, not superiority. As Tidmarsh points out, a unity of 
interests exists when “all classes . . . possess a unity of interest along one of the three elements of 
a claim (facts, law, or remedy) and a substantial overlap of interest along the other two elements.” 
See id. This abbreviated summary gives short shrift to Professor Tidmarsh’s more provocative 
discussion of how to balance individual autonomy concerns and judicial redress goals. However, 
the endpoint of his argument matches this Article’s reframing of superiority. 
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some courts.267 Revising Rule 23(b)(3)’s language to focus on 
predominance and foregoing a separate manageability analysis checks 
outlier district courts that deny certification simply because such cases 
are time-consuming.268 
Take, for example, the judicial splits over whether choice of law 
questions preclude manageability, as discussed in Part I. Predominance 
determinations already overlap with choice of law questions.269 When 
the law governing the claims asserted is too diffuse, predominance will 
not be satisfied. Eliminating manageability avoids a second forum for 
duplicative, potentially conflicting analysis. 
That said, using predominance to absorb superiority poses some 
issues. Courts differ on just how many common questions are necessary, 
as well as how to define class cohesion.270 However, in resolving these 
open questions, district courts have recent Supreme Court 
guidance271—something missing in superiority.272 Further, appellate 
courts to date have weighed in on predominance more than 
superiority.273 This guidance restrains the range of possible 
predominance interpretations, unlike the ever-splintering superiority 
analyses. It also supports this Article’s proposal to eliminate the 
 
 267.  At least eight circuits already have such a presumption. Fraser v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
No. 2:13-CV-00520-TLN-DAD, 2014 WL 7336673, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 24, 2014); see also MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, Part I § 1.43 n.72 (1977) (“[D]ismissal for management reasons, in view 
of the public interest involved in class actions, should be the exception rather than the rule.”). 
 268.  See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool Prods. Liab. Litig., 241 F.R.D. 305, 314 (S.D. 
Ill. 2007) (recognizing the value of certifying an issue class but denying certification in part because 
of its “crowded docket”). 
 269.  Compare In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015–
19 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiffs must be governed by one state law), with In re Nigeria 
Charter Flights Contract Litig., 233 F.R.D. 297, 305–06 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that courts may 
apply the laws of multiple states in one class action). 
 270.  See, e.g., Claire E. Bourque, Liability Only, Please—Hold the Damages: The Supreme 
Court’s New Order for Class Certification, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 695, 708 (2015) (discussing the 
current confusion over how to define predominance). 
 271.  See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. 
Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2013). 
 272.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the lack of judicial review for superiority). 
 273.  See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2015); EQT Prod. Co. v. 
Adair, 764 F.3d 347, 366 (4th Cir. 2014); In re Johnson, 760 F.3d 66, 74 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Abdullah 
v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 731 F.3d 952, 963–64 (9th Cir. 2013); Halvorson v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
718 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2013); Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 814 
(7th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 568 F.3d 1350, 1357–59 (11th Cir. 2009); In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008); Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay 
LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Scrap Metal Antitrust Litig., 527 F.3d 517, 535 (6th 
Cir. 2008); McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 222 (2d Cir. 2008); Monreal v. Potter, 
367 F.3d 1224, 1237 (10th Cir. 2004). 
4-Bartholomew_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2016 4:51 PM 
2016] SUPERIORITY 1339 
 
requirement and to remove a second round of questioning about 
individuals’ interests and manageability. 
2. Remaining Inquiries and Procedural Alternatives 
While predominance absorbs much of the superiority 
requirement, other procedural rules—including other parts of Rule 
23—also abrogate the remaining superiority factors. To begin, the 
Judicial Multidistrict Litigation Proceeding (“MDL”) process makes the 
pending litigation and forum factors unnecessary.274 Two years after 
adding the superiority requirement, Congress created the MDL process, 
under which civil actions sharing common questions are coordinated 
and then transferred to a single judicial district for pretrial purposes.275 
The MDL process only applies to federal cases. By expanding federal 
diversity jurisdiction in 2005,276 the Class Action Fairness Act 
effectively enlarged the reach of the MDL process.277 The MDL decision 
intersects with the “pending litigation” factor: it results in fewer 
pending cases and provides an analysis of consolidation. The 
superiority analysis can question that decision, inviting inconsistent 
MDL and trial court rulings. 
Similarly, the MDL process addresses the appropriate forum.278 
Trial courts undertake this second-guessing under superiority without 
sufficient guidance on how to evaluate pending litigation or the 
 
 274.  28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 275.  See id.; see also Scott Paetty, Classless Not Clueless: A Comparison of Case Management 
Mechanisms for Non-Class-Based Complex Litigation in California and Federal Courts, 41 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 845, 848 (2008) (describing the MDL process). 
 276.  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 277.  See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act 
on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 
1751 (2008) (finding seventy-two percent overall increase in class action activity in the eighty-
eight district courts studied); Sarah S. Vance, A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
80 TUL. L. REV. 1617, 1642 (2006) (discussing the intersection between the MDL process and 
CAFA’s expanded jurisdiction). For any parallel state claims, courts can analyze the impact of such 
cases through predominance and manageability. 
 278.  See Anderson Living Tr. v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D. 312, 406 n.56 (D.N.M. 
2015) (stating “the court should respect [the MDL] decision and exclude the possibility of 
multidistrict litigation from its superiority analysis”); In re Energy Sys. Equip. Leasing Sec. Litig., 
642 F. Supp. 718, 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“Factors such as those set forth in Rule 23(b)(3) have 
already been considered by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in determining whether 
to transfer the various pending federal cases involving the Systems to this Court . . . .”); In re S. 
Cent. States Bakery Prods. Antitrust Litig., 86 F.R.D. 407, 423 (M.D. La. 1980) (recognizing 
overlap between MDL decision and superiority). 
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forum.279 Though many courts apply principled approaches to these 
questions,280 some have adopted interpretations that spell the realistic 
end for a case.281 Collapsing the superiority analysis and the MDL 
process resolves these inconsistencies. 
As for the remaining superiority question, alternative methods, 
Rule 23 currently addresses this.282 Rule 23(a)(4) requires a showing 
that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.”283 Some courts already use this requirement to 
analyze private methods of resolving a putative claim. For example, in 
In re Aqua Dots Products Liability Litigation, the trial court denied 
superiority for purchasers of a toxic toy.284 While the trial court found 
the defendant’s limited recalls superior to litigation, the Seventh 
Circuit reversed.285 Chief Judge Easterbrook held private remedies 
were better addressed under Rule 23(a)(4) than under superiority.286 
 
 279.  Neither the MDL rules nor Rule 23 provide guidance on the interaction—if any—between 
this process and these factors. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
 280.  See In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 76 F.R.D. 570, 587 (E.D. La. 1976) (recognizing that 
post-MDL consolidation, the forum factor is irrelevant). 
 281.  The mere existence of other litigation weighs against superiority, without analysis of the 
case’s status or the scope of the claims asserted. See, e.g., Vassalle v. Midland Funding LLC, 708 
F.3d 747, 758 (6th Cir. 2013); Real Estate Alliance, Ltd. v. Sarkisian, No. CIV. A. 05-CV-3573, 
2007 WL 2814591, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2007).  
 282.  Predominance also address alternative methods of adjudication. If a defendant has 
already provided an extensive variety of private refunds, this impacts whether there are too many 
individualized defenses. See, e.g., Vaccariello v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., 295 F.R.D. 62, 74 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding lack of predominance because of individualized defenses based on rebate 
program). Likewise, if the relief from a concurrently pending administrative action creates 
individualized damages issues, that, too, impacts predominance. See, e.g., In re Ford Motor Co. 
Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 347 (D.N.J. 1997) (discussing how potential 
administrative action impacts predominance and superiority). 
 283.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4). 
 284.  654 F.3d 748, 749 (7th Cir. 2011).  
 285.  See id. at 751–52.  
 286.  Id. This is not to say, however, that courts should find a class representative inadequate 
merely because she did not participate in a defendant’s private remedy offering (such as a recall). 
To the contrary, such private recalls often forego the benefits of collective action, such as 
information sharing. See Bartholomew, supra note 235, at 784–86; see also D. Theodore Rave, 
Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5 J. TORT L. 91, 116 (2012) (discussing the risks 
associated with private remedies including “less robust” bargaining process though approving of 
the ADR program in Aqua Dots). Instead, the point here is subtler: courts are already considering 
how to address private remedies under aspects of Rule 23. A second discussion of such offers under 
superiority currently serves no consistent screening function, thus making such an analysis not 
only unnecessary but problematic.  
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Other private alternatives, such as arbitration, are now a basis 
for dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).287 Further, 
motions to stay capture overlapping pending government or 
administrative actions.288 Such stays require the actual existence of 
pending actions, unlike the superiority analysis by which courts deny 
certification based on little more than the hypothetical potential for 
such cases.289 After the resolution of such government or administrative 
action, the court can decide whether remaining issues, if any, 
predominate.290 If no such issues exist, a motion to dismiss can then be 
granted.291 
Hence, between the predominance requirement and the 
procedural rules above, superiority questions will still be addressed. 
Eliminating superiority just cures the problems posed by the 
requirement without foregoing judicial resolution of these superiority 
questions. 
C. Strengthening Case Management 
With the superiority factors absorbed elsewhere, only one more 
piece is needed to nix superiority: stronger case management tools. 
Class actions challenge courts and litigants alike.292 The manageability 
factor could provide the judiciary and the parties an opening to chart 
the litigation’s course.293 However, the adversarial posture of 
manageability hinders planning efforts. Plaintiffs are incentivized to 
downplay the challenges of litigating a putative class action while 
defendants amplify such potentialities. For the generalist judge, this 
 
 287.  See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC 
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 288.  Such stays based on pending government action are required for securities class actions. 
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
 289.  See, e.g., Martin v. Ford Motor Co., 292 F.R.D. 252, 283 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (finding lack of 
superiority based on the mere potential for NHTSA to investigate the faulty rear axle design). 
 290.  See, e.g., Cnty. of Stanislaus v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., No. CV-F-93-5866-OWW, 1994 WL 
706711, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 1994) (granting certification despite public utility administrative 
agency’s hearing since it did not fully address the antitrust claims). 
 291.  See, e.g., Wechsler v. Se. Props., Inc., 63 F.R.D. 13, 16 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 506 F.2d 631 (2d 
Cir. 1974) (dismissing class claims after resolution of Attorney General action that obtained 
sufficient relief). 
 292.  See Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits 
of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1692 (1992). 
 293.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D) (directing courts to also make determinations on “the likely 
difficulties in managing a class action” when considering class certification). 
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means the factor invites faulty information about how potential 
procedural tools could streamline litigation. 
Rather than tinkering to redefine manageability, a better course 
of action is to sharpen existing case management tools. Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 16 already requires a trial plan294 and empowers courts 
to generate “special procedures” for complex cases.295 The proposal, 
here, is to fortify such existing case management tools and require 
partial trial plans in advance of class certification.296 These plans must 
be detailed, addressing the utility and limits of case management tools, 
ranging from multi-phased trials to subclassing to bifurcation.297 They 
should also address staying or coordinating any pending parallel state 
cases.298 If the parties fail to reach consensus, the court can appoint a 
 
 294.  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(4). Courts should use their power to sanction those who fail to 
generate trial plans in bad faith. See Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, “Defensible” by What Standard?, 13 
SEDONA CONF. J. 217, 227 (2012) (“[A]n attorney or party that does not participate in good faith in 
developing and submitting a proposed discovery plan as required by Rule 26(f) can be required to 
pay the other party’s reasonable fees and costs caused by that failure. The same sanctions can be 
imposed on a party or attorney who is substantially unprepared to participate in the Rule 16(b) 
scheduling conference.” (footnote omitted)). 
 295.  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(L) (authorizing judges to adopt “special procedures for managing 
potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, 
difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems”). 
 296.  See, e.g., Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 453 F.3d 179, 186 n.7 (3d Cir. 
2006) (“[W]e note that . . . the pre-certification . . . trial plans . . . could be used . . . by the parties 
[to] aid[ ] trial courts in defining the precise parameters of a given class for certification 
purposes.”). The remainder of the topics covered in a Rule 16 trial plan would still be submitted 
pretrial. 
 297.  See, e.g., In re Live Concert Antitrust Litig., 247 F.R.D. 98, 149 (C.D. Cal. 2007) 
(discussing potential case management tools available in class actions). Ascertainability would not 
be part of this joint trial plan. Numerosity, notice requirements, and Rule 23’s requirement that a 
certification order “define the class and class claims, issues, or defenses” negate the need for a 
separate ascertainability inquiry. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).  Numerosity already ensures 
there is a clear definition of the class.  See, e.g., Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 357 
(3d Cir. 2013) (illustrating the intersection between ascertainability and numerosity); Knutson v. 
Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., No. 3:12-CV-0964-GPC-DHB, 2013 WL 3746118, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 
15, 2013) (same). Unlike superiority, the requirements for class notice are well-defined. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).   
 298.  See Carlough v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 10 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing how 
impending settlements in federal actions justify staying duplicative state actions); Manning v. 
Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222, 223 (6th Cir. 1988) (staying pending resolution 
of parallel state case informally); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 1.02 
(2010) (promoting judicial communication to resolve manageability issues in parallel state and 
federal class actions); cf. William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination 
of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1732–33 (1992) (stating 
“intersystem coordination has proven effective in accomplishing the[ ] goals” of promoting 
economy, efficiency and consistency). 
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special master to assist.299 Further, if unanticipated issues arise during 
the litigation, such plans should be revised accordingly. 
Parties already have the information necessary for such 
planning.300 Class action attorneys—both for plaintiffs and 
defendants—often have significant expertise and understanding of the 
frequently encountered issues in such cases.301 In fact, these attorneys 
already use this knowledge to generate joint pre-trial case management 
and discovery plans.302 Using this expertise to overcome the challenges 
of managing a class action expands current collaboration, with the hope 
of increasing the efficacy and the quality of judicial decisions.303 Shared 
trial manageability strategies could generate a body of creative 
solutions to guide the judiciary through class action challenges. 
A critic might oppose this proposal, arguing instead for a more 
limited approach, such as a presumption of manageability or making 
the manageability test less rigorous for small-stake cases. The problem 
would remain, however, that such approaches would once again devolve 
into arbitrary line-drawing—this time not for what is manageability 
but for when the presumption is rebutted. Is it unmanageable if a case 
would take years to adjudicate? If so, how many years is too many? 
Similarly, is it unmanageable because the case involves the laws of 
multiple states? If so, how many states is too many? Courts have 
already tried to identify the tolerable quantum of manageability for 
class action certification. Just how polarized courts are in defining that 
 
 299.  See, e.g., Jack Ratliff, Special Master’s Report in Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 REV. 
LITIG. 521, 521 (1991). 
 300.  Counsel often already generate various plans for clients. See Perry Elizabeth Pearce, 
What In-House and Outside Counsel Should Tell Each Other, PRAC. LAW., April 1995, at 29, 30. 
Further, some courts already require trial plans, but only from the plaintiff. See Barnes v. District 
of Columbia, 278 F.R.D. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing plaintiffs’ trial plans); Ancar v. Murphy 
Oil, U.S.A., Inc., 2008 WL 2951794, *2 n.8 (E.D. La. July 25, 2008) (same); In re Paxil Litig., 212 
F.R.D. 539, 542 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (same); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 334–35 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (same). 
 301.  See, e.g., Wallace v. Powell, 288 F.R.D. 347, 374 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (detailing how the 
counsel has “extensive experience” litigating class actions); In re Am. Investors Life Ins. Co. 
Annuity Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 263 F.R.D. 226, 235 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (same); J. Douglas 
Peters & David R. Parker, The History, Law, and Future of State Class Actions in Michigan, 44 
WAYNE L. REV. 135, 200 (1998) (noting how “the complexity and length of some class actions, 
together with the financial risk and up-front costs required to maintain class litigation” generate 
class action specialists). 
 302.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3) (describing joint discovery plans); see also Charles W. Sorenson, 
Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)—“Much Ado About Nothing?”, 46 
HASTINGS L.J. 679, 725 (1995) (describing joint discovery plans). 
 303.  These decisions should be published and kept in a repository for use in subsequent cases. 
Such a repository already exists for mass torts. See, e.g., LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES § 10:32. 
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baseline shows why even a presumption or a sliding scale of rigor is 
unworkable. 
Thus, eliminating manageability and instead fortifying case 
management tools ensures courts will not screen cases based on 
generalized class action hostility.304 With this last piece of the revised 
(b)(3) analysis explained, the next step is to debunk the false need for 
more class action gatekeeping. 
D. Answering Critics: The Questionable Superiority Screen 
The most likely criticism of this proposal is that it might make 
class certification easier.305 Such criticism overlooks the challenges of 
proving predominance. Further, as previously discussed, other 
procedural mechanisms will still explore superiority questions. What 
the proposal does is clarify the certification analysis while minimizing 
the redundant, inconsistent analyses superiority currently affords. 
More critically, though, the arguments of those who would 
bemoan the loss of superiority’s screening potential rest on faulty 
premises. First, this potential concern assumes superiority actually is 
a serviceable screen.306 However, the problems detailed at length in 
Parts I and II prove the requirement lacks sufficient beacons to guide 
when access to justice should give way to efficiency.307 For a screen to 
properly function, it must first be applied consistently.308 
Second, and perhaps most disconcerting, is the underlying 
assumption that more class action screening is needed.309 This 
 
 304.  See Muehler v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1370, 1375–76 (D. Minn. 1985) (“We 
have now seen that many judges openly and on the record have suspicion and disdain for class 
actions as a means of redress. . . . Such actions have already gone a long way toward sounding the 
‘death knell’ for class actions.”). 
 305.  Critics argue class actions force blackmail settlements, though the hyperbolic nature of 
the attack has already been exposed. See Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail 
Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 693–96, 704 (2005) 
(demonstrating that “actual settlement rates among certified class actions as well as the 
availability of dispositive motions both undermine the accuracy of the hydraulic pressure claim”). 
Thus, this Article focuses more on generalized screening arguments. 
 306.  See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing the convoluted state of superiority screening). 
 307.  See supra Part II.B.2 (listing varying efficiency interpretations). 
 308.  Cf. John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding Road to the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 345–46 (1996) (explaining the 
PSLRA is a faulty screen because of its inconsistent application). 
 309.  The rationale for more screening through superiority also overlooks how such screening 
is not the cost-saving panacea those seeking judicial efficiency might hope for. See Robert G. Bone 
& David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1329 (2002) 
4-Bartholomew_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2016 4:51 PM 
2016] SUPERIORITY 1345 
 
assumption overlooks the last three decades of increased screening in 
many key areas of law commonly brought as class actions.310 Such 
changes began in the 1980s with the overhaul of Rule 11, followed by 
increased summary judgment requirements in 1985.311 In the 1990s, 
heightened screening came in different forms, such as the Private 
Securities Litigation Act.312 Since 2000, the screening mantra led to 
more radical procedural changes, both legislatively with CAFA and 
through a series of Supreme Court decisions.313 These decisions now 
shut out a wide swath of class actions by forcing such claims into private 
arbitration.314 For those that remain, such cases are screened through 
heightened pleading315 and class certification requirements.316 The 
cumulative impact of these procedural screens has not yet been fully 
felt, though empirical evidence and qualitative analyses suggest the 
effects are significant.317 There is no evidence further screening is 
needed. 
 
(explaining how early screens generate costs of their own, including error costs and increased 
process costs). 
 310.  See Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 3244 (“Procedural gatekeeping in class actions is on 
the rise.”); Sheldon Whitehouse, Restoring the Civil Jury’s Role in the Structure of Our 
Government, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1241, 1261 (2014) (“[Justice] Roberts[’s] Court decisions have 
also restricted access to class action litigation.”). 
 311.  Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 521–22 (1997) 
(detailing the increasing procedural screening of the 1980s and 1990s); Suzette Malveaux, A 
Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Its 
Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455, 456–57 (2014) (noting the general 
increase in procedural hurdles across time). 
 312.  Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 313.  See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 349–50 
(2011); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
 314.  See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (enforcing arbitration 
provision with class waiver); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (same). 
 315.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562; cf. Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading 
Complex Litigation in the Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2005 (2010) 
(discussing how screening through motions to dismiss is particularly questionable given the 
purpose of Rule 8). 
 316.  See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1428–29 (2013); Dukes, 564 U.S. at 
349–50. 
 317.  See Miller, supra note 1, at 318 (2013) (discussing how restrictive interpretations of Rule 
23 have “chilled much of its innovative application”). 
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Third, even assuming class actions need more screening,318 
superiority is not the appropriate mechanism.319 As discussed at length 
in Part II.B, screening under superiority depends on the interpretation 
a particular judge adopts.320 Screening mechanisms that employ such 
value judgments lack accuracy. One need only consider the recent 
change to pleading standards to prove this point.321 Under Twiqbal, the 
Supreme Court heightened the pleading requirement to filter 
potentially unmeritorious claims.322 If this were an effective screen, one 
would have expected a corresponding drop of summary judgment 
motions after Twiqbal: if more cases were screened out on motions to 
dismiss, fewer questionable cases would need to be screened under Rule 
 
 318.  Such an assumption is questionable. See Robert G. Bone, Walking the Class Action Maze: 
Toward A More Functional Rule 23, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1097, 1119 (2013) (“Insofar as this 
strict pleading standard already performs a screening function, there might be no need for—and 
it might not be a good idea to adopt—a strict certification standard as well.”). This is particularly 
true given superiority is part of Rule 23. See Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided 
Trend Toward Resolving Merits Disputes As Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 935, 939 (2009) (“Lawmakers did not intend courts to use Rule 23 as a screening device; they 
provided other, superior, screening mechanisms instead.”).   
 319.  For example, take courts that use superiority to screen out cases based on arguments 
that the resulting damages are disproportionate to the actual harm suffered. See supra Part I.B.1 
and accompanying notes. The quantum of damages in such cases is defined statutorily. See, e.g., 
Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(2)(B) (2012) (setting a statutory violation rate of no more 
than the lesser of $1,000,000 or one percent of the creditor’s net worth). Thus, if the damages as 
aggregated are disproportionate (a debatable point), the appropriate fix is the substantive 
statutory law giving rise to those damages—not through Rule 23. See, e.g., Murray v. GMAC 
Mortgage Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 954 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Maybe suits such as this will lead Congress to 
amend the Fair Credit Reporting Act; maybe not. While a statute remains on the books, however, 
it must be enforced rather than subverted.”). Any contrary approach invites the very problems that 
exist with superiority, namely judicial application of a procedural rule that lacks consistent 
transsubstantive application. See supra Part II.A. (explaining why a procedural rule should apply 
equally across different substantive claims) and Part III.A. (discussing the Rules Enabling Act and 
limits on procedural rule interpretation). Thus, using superiority as a screen creates more 
problems than it solves. 
 320.  See supra Part II.B.; see also Roger J. Traynor, La Rude Vita, La Dolce Giustizia; or Hard 
Cases Can Make Good Law, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 234 (1962) (discussing the difficulty of judicial 
decisionmaking). 
 321.  See Effron, supra note 315, at 2000 (“For nearly fifty years, courts and commentators 
viewed the pleading stage as a relatively weak point for the exercise of gatekeeping.”). 
 322.  See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
562 (2007). Twiqbal replaced the “notice pleading” standard previously in place for the prior fifty 
years. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Under Twiqbal, a plaintiff must show not just 
a legally conceivable claim for relief but a factually “plausible” one. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679–81; 
David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. 
L. REV. 1203, 1248 (2013). 
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56.323 Instead, there was no reduction in summary judgments.324 
Rather, the new standard has created grave concerns about false-
positives, striking out cases not based on their potential merit but 
rather on a given judge’s definition of plausibility.325 
In contrast, merit-based determinations evaluate whether the 
evidence supports the substantive claim, unlike procedural 
mechanisms which focus on unevenly defined questions of efficiency.326 
Merit-based determinations allow judges to evaluate whether a 
particular claim is frivolous based on more than conjecture about what 
the evidence might someday prove. This in turn offsets the risk of 
chilling potentially legitimate claims. 
Thus, even after nullifying superiority, class actions will still be 
sufficiently screened. Not every putative class will automatically be 
certified. Courts will continue to preclude many claims, just through 
other procedural rules or based on merit determinations. These 
determinations, though, provide a type of gatekeeping that comes closer 
to balancing access and fairness than superiority: plaintiffs have the 
potential to air their grievances, and defendants have the benefit of 
class-wide issue preclusion should the claims prove meritless.327 Hence, 
this Article’s proposal to eliminate the superiority requirement is both 
workable and defensible. 
CONCLUSION 
The superiority experiment has failed. After fifty years, the 
judiciary is no closer to deciding when a putative class action is 
sufficiently superior to certify under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
 
 323.  See JONAH B. GELBACH, MATERIAL FACTS IN THE DISPUTE OVER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL: 
USING DEFENSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT WIN RATES TO MEASURE THE QUALITY OF CASES AFFECTED 
BY HEIGHTENED PLEADING (CELS Version, Nov. 2012) (undertaking an empirical examination of 
the extent to which Twiqbal has affected the merit of cases that proceed past the 12(b)(6) stage). 
 324.  See id. at 9–10. 
 325.  See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 
517, 556–57 (2010) (discussing how Twiqbal is a seemly transubstantive procedural rule that 
works like a substantive one, impacting some causes of action more than others). 
 326.  See Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 12–14 (2010) (discussing how the current trend towards 
rising procedural gatekeeping based on efficiency limits judicial access). 
 327.  See Antonio Gidi, Loneliness in the Crowd: Why Nobody Wants Opt-Out Class Members 
to Assert Offensive Issue Preclusion Against Class Defendants, 66 SMU L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2013); 
Debra J. Gross, Mandatory Notice and Defendant Class Actions: Resolving the Paradox of Identity 
Between Plaintiffs and Defendants, 40 EMORY L.J. 611, 616 (1991) (discussing the benefits of 
certification). 
4-Bartholomew_PAGE (Do Not Delete) 10/5/2016 4:51 PM 
1348 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:5:1295 
 
23(b)(3). Instead, jurisprudence is plagued with inconsistent 
interpretations. The full scale of the problem is only evident after 
uncovering how deep these divides run. Each aspect of the superiority 
analysis draws more inconsistency, thus threatening not only the rule 
of law, but also the ability of parties to predict and plan litigation 
strategies. For putative class members, the risks are more pernicious: 
inconsistent superiority decisions mean certification depends on the 
assigned judge rather than the particularities of a given case. It is 
difficult to reconcile such inconsistency with basic principles of fairness, 
let alone the predictability aims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
more generally. 
Left untreated, the superiority requirement’s afflictions will 
likely fester. Superiority’s interpretative divides are a result of deeply 
embedded problems with the crafting of the requirement. Not only does 
it lack concrete textual guidance, its underlying, conflicting policy goals 
allow courts to define superiority as they please. 
Hence, the best treatment for this ailment is eliminating the 
requirement and fortifying case management tools. Superiority is an 
inferior method for exploring the variety of issues that arise in a class 
certification analysis. In place of forcing legal questions into this faulty 
framework, courts can instead rely on alternative procedural rules, as 
well as other aspects of Rule 23, to resolve these issues. This approach 
maintains the rigor of the class certification analysis while starving the 
growth of further paradoxical superiority jurisprudence. In doing so, the 
botched superiority experiment can finally end. 
 
